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Is China a "Currency Manipulator"?: The
Legitimacy of China's Exchange Regime Under
the Current International Legal Framework
BRYAN MERCURIO* & CELINE SZE NING LEUNG**

Abstract
While most economists are in agreement that China's currency is undervalued, economists are
less certain as to the effect of the undervaluation. Despite the equivocal data, critics of China's
regime claim that the undervaluation leads to cheaper, and therefore increased exported goods,
while at the same time raising the price of imported goods. For this reason, U.S. lawmakers
perpetually raise the issue and periodically initiate legislation, which would deem China a "currency manipulator" and thus triggerretaliatory measures. Lawyers are less certain whether there
can be a multilateralsolution to the perceived problem.
With the existing legal literatureconsisting mostly of industry-finded research, the time is ripe
to undertake a large-scalelegal analysis of China's exchange regime under the existing international legalframework. This article undertakes such an analysis and in particular,evaluates the
legitimacy of China's exchange regime under applicable internationallaw, that being the Articles
of Agreement of the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and both the GeneralAgreement on
Tariffi and Trade and the Agreement on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). We conclude that while China clearly manipulates its currency, its
measures are not inconsistent with the IMF Articles or the applicable VTO agreements. The
article concludes hy noting that modification of either the IMF Articles or applicable WTO agreements is the only multilateraloption available to those determined to more strongly sanction "currency manipulation."

* Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law; Fellow, Tim Fischer Centre for Global
Trade and Finance.
** Clifford Chance, Hong Kong. Ms Leung is a Hang Seng Scholar and was awarded the Hong Kong
Schools Alumni Federation Scholarship (together with the Hang Seng Bank (Overseas) Scholarship) to study
at Princeton University. She graduated from Princeton University with a B.A. in Economics, Certificate in
Finance, and received her J.D. from the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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Introduction

China's exchange regimeI has long been the subject of international criticism. Among
the complainants are the United States, Japan, and the European Union,2 with the United
States being the most vocal critic. Most U.S. criticisms assert that China's currency is
undervalued, thereby making Chinese exports into the United States cheaper while at the
same time increasing the price of American exports to China. 3 These price differences,
the critics claim, harm U.S. production, particularly in the manufacturing sector. The
core complaint is that Chinese exporters receive an unfair advantage due to the undervalued exchange rate. 4 Such criticism recently culminated in U.S. Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner accusing China of "manipulating" its currency. 5 In doing so, Geithner
1.This article uses the term "exchange regime" interchangeably with "exchange arrangement" to mean
the general exchange rate framework or system which a country adopts (e.g. floating exchange rate system or
managed float). This definition is based on the IMF Legal Department definition for "exchange arrangement"-the exchange system's broad classification or framework. See Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Article IVof
the Fund's Articles of Agreement: An Overview of the Legal Framework, June 28, 2006, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2006/062806.pdf [hereinafter Article IV Overview]. For more detailed information on
exchange rates and regimes, see JOSEPH GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZA"rON (American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice 1988).
2. See, e.g., RONAL1 I. McKiNNON, ExCHANGE RATES UNDER THE EAST ASIAN DOLLAR STANDARD
138 (The MIT Press 2005); M. Ulric Killion, China's Foreign Currency Regime: The Kagan Thesis and Legalification of the WTO Agreement, 14 MI ,N.J. GLOBAL TRADE 43, 44 (2004); That Chinese "Juggernaut'-Should
Europe Really Worry About its Trade Deficit with China? (Euro. Ctr. for Int'l Pol. Econ. [ECIPE], Briefing
Paper No. 2/2008, 2008); Trade Disputes Between China and the EU (E.Asian Inst. [EAI], Background Brief
No. 416, 2008), http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB416.pdf.
3. The U.S. trade deficit with China was $266 billion in 2008. See Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte,
China's Currency: A Summary of the Economic Issues, RS21625, Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21625.pdf. For criticisms of China's policies,
see, e.g., China Currency Coalition, Petitionfor Relief Under Section 301(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended
(Sept. 9, 2004), http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org/petition.html; C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Inst. for
Int'l Econ., The Dollar and the Renminbi, Statement Before the Hearing on U.S. Economic Relations with
China (May 23, 2007), http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchlD=747.; Peter Morici,
Currency Manipulation and Free Trade (Dec. 2004), http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/pmorici/MoriciPaper onCurrency.Manipulation.pdf.; Lael Brainard, Global riews: Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform
Act of 2007, BROOKINGS, June 14, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0614globaleconomics
brainard.aspx
4. Of course, critics ignore U.S. benefits, such as those to U.S. firms and consumers (in the form of both
cheaper goods and increased and cheaper credit) and to U.S. enterprises manufacturing in China. Critics also
ignore the detriments of an undervalued exchange rate to China, including the increased costs of importing
necessary inputs. See Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 3-5 (finding no medium or long-term effect on
aggregate U.S. employment).
5. Geithner made the accusation in writing to the Senate Finance Committee immediately prior to the
Committee's vote torecommend his confirmation as Treasury Secretary. See Hearing on Confirmationof Mr.
Timothy F. Geithner to beSecretary of the U.S. Departmentof Treasury, United States S. Comm. on Fin. (an. 21,
2009), http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202009/012209%20TFG%20Questions.pdf [Hereinafter Geithner Confirmation Hearing]. ("Geithner Confirmation Hearing"). For background and more informationSee Jackie Chalmes, GeitbnerHints at HarderLine on China Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, available at
http://nytimes.com/2009/01/2 3/business/worldbusiness/23 treasury.html?_r= 1. It must be noted that
Geithner did not assert that China's was manipulating its currency in order to gain an unfair trade advantage.
Under U.S. law, if a country is found to be manipulating its currency's exchange rate with the U.S. dollar
"for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustuents or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade," the Treasury secretary must "initiate negotiations with such foreign countries on
an expedited basis, in the International Monetary Fund or bilaterally, for the purpose of ensuring that such
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also declared that his accusations had presidential backing: "President Obama-backed by
the conclusions of a broad range of economists-believes that China is manipulating its
6
currency."
While the Obama Administration, and even Geithner himself, have subsequently renounced the direct and unambiguous accusation of currency manipulation,? the U.S. reversal is no doubt influenced by the severity of the current financial crisis, the considerable
weaknesses of the U.S. economy, and American dependence on Chinese credit (through
the purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds) to sustain its current account deficit.8 U.S. legislators, however, do not share the Administration's diplomatic (and pragmatic) considerations and have pressed ahead with plans to unilaterally counter China's "currency
manipulation." 9
Despite what appears to be a temporary reprieve from the Administration, the issue of
whether China manipulates its currency is bound to resurface at some Lime iII the future.
countries regularly and promptly adjust the rate of exchange between their currencies and the United States
dollar." Id. The Act, however, contains an out clause which allows the secretary some discretion: "[the
secretary] shall not be required to initiate negotiations in cases where such negotiations would have a serious
detrimental impact on vital national economic and security interests". See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5304 (2009).
6. Geithner Confirmation Hearing, supra note 5.
7. In April 2009, a mere three months after Geithner's accusation of currency manipulation, the Administration's semi-annual Treasury report to Congress on international currency practices (as required under
Section 3004(b) of the 1988 Act) declined to label China a currency manipulator (such a label would have
triggered the provisions in the 1988 Act outlined in footnote 5). See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE
OF INT'L AFFAIRS, REPORT TO CONG. ON INT'L ECON. AND Excii. RATE POLICIES (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-exchange-rates/.
8. On the weakness of the U.S. economy, see Surviving the Slump, ECONOVISTr, May 30, 2009, availableat
http://www.accruent.com/Documents/Articles/Economist_TradingDown-0509.pdf. For statistics on the
U.S.-China trading relationship, see OFFICE OF TIlE U.S. TRADE RE PRFSENTATVF, ExFCitrriv

OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china (last visited August 6, 2009). On the U.S. administration's desire for China to continue purchasing U.S. Treasuries (as well as the underlying weakness in
the U.S. economy), see Axel Merk, Geithner & China on U.S. Treasury Bonds Sales Trip: Who Are YouFooling?
(June 2, 2009), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Articlel1046.html; Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Clinton Urges
China to Keep Buying U.S. Treasury Securities, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 22, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=apSqGtcNsqSY&refer=politics.
9. See, e.g., the statements and actions of the U.S. Congress and its representatives. The bipartisan supported "Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act" allows for the use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties to
counter currency manipulation. Republican Representative Tim Murphy says of the legislation: "The time
has come for Congress to stand up for American workers and not allow China to run roughshod over the
American economy. With this legislation we will finally force China to stop cheating and level the playing
field for America's manufacturers." See U.S. Lawmakers Target China Currency Policy, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 14, 2009, availableat http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/us-lawmakers-targetchina-currency-policy-20090514-b408.html. See also, the earlier Schumer-Graham Bill (which also called for
countervailing duties to counter undervaluation) and the Grassley-Baucus Bill (which called for greater IMF
and U.S. cooperation and oversight into currency misalignment); see also Press Release from Senator Charles
E. Schumer, Schumer-Graham Announce Bipartisan Bill to Level Playing Field on China Trade (Feb. 3,
2005), http://schumer.senate.gov/new-website/record.cfin?id=260875&.
(Senator Schumer stated: "The
Chinese actions endanger American and world commitment to free trade and weaken the support in Congress for free trade. This legislation is a tough-love effort to get the Chinese to stop playing games with their
currency in order to level the playing field for American companies trying to compete with goods and service
coming from China."); Criton M. Zoakos, Introducing "Grassley-Baucus,"THE LNYTL
ECON., Spring 2006, at
26. For criticism of legislative efforts, see Daniel Griswold, Protectionism No Fix for China's Currency, CATO
INST., June 25, 2005, http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=3946.
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For this reason, it remains necessary to undertake a legal analysis of China's exchange
regime under the existing international legal framework. 10 This article undertakes such
an analysis and in particular, evaluates the legitimacy of China's exchange regime under
applicable international law, that being the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF Articles) and both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Section II overviews the recent modifications to China's exchange arrangement and
other relevant issues relating to the Renminbi (RMB).1I Section III analyzes the regime
under the IMF Articles and the VWTO agreements and concludes that China's exchange
regime does not violate any of the current applicable international laws. Section IV concludes by noting that modification of either the IMF Articles or applicable VTO agreements is the only multilateral option available to those determined to more strongly
sanction "currency manipulation."

II.

China's Exchange Regime

China's present foreign exchange regime is a result of a process that began shortly after
China embarked on its path of liberalization in 1978; since that time, the country has
adopted various exchange rates 12 and foreign exchange control policies. 13 Section A
overviews China's post-liberalization changes to its exchange regime, while Section B discusses China's measures to control the RIMB exchange rate. Section C then examines the
movement of the RMB exchange rate and the resulting controversies.

A.

CHINA'S EXCHANGE REGLME: AN OVERVIEW

As part of the policy shift embracing trade liberalization, China began to devalue its
currency in the early-1980s to reflect a more realistic value of the RMB.14 Since that time,
10. Indeed, Subramanian and Mattoo call the undervaluation of major currencies leads to "one of the most
pressing contemporary problems-global imbalances" Arvind Subramanian & Aadieya Mattoo, Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization 2 (Ctr. for Global Dev.,
Working Paper No. 142, 2008). It should also be noted that China is not the only country accused of undervaluing its currency. In fact, in the oil-boom years of 2001-July 2007, the currencies of United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Venezuela all depreciated by approximately twenty percent against
the U.S. dollar. Id.
11. The Chinese currency is referred to as the renminbi (RMB) (literally translated as "the people's currency") or the yuan (which technically is a unit of measurement used when counting). For consistency and
ease of reference, we exclusively use the term RMB.
12. Exchange rate policy refers to the country's response to particular market fluctuations. It is therefore
narrower in scope when compared with exchange arrangement. Indeed exchange rate policy can be regarded
as a policy which the country adopts in realization of its exchange arrangement. For more detailed information, see Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 4.
13. Foreign exchange control policy refers to the policy a country uses to regulate foreign exchange receipts and payment; that is, the currency's convertibility. See DoNG BuSINEss WITH CHINA 110 fJonathan
Reuvid & Li Yong eds., Global Market Briefing 4th ed. 2003).
14. BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSMONS AND GROW'rH 383 (2007). For China's
policies from 1949 onwards, see Larry L. Drumm, ChangingMoney: Foreign Exchange Reform in the People's
Republic of China, 18 HAS-rINGs L\-r'L & CoMP. L. REV. 359, 362-63 (1995).
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China has modified its exchange regime several times.15 What remains unchanged is that
the People's Bank of China (PBC)-as the central bank of China-is the sole issuer and
controller of the RMB.16
1.

1994-2005: From a Peg Within a Small Band To a De Facto Peg

China began modifying its exchange regime in earnest in 1986, when the government
introduced a dual-exchange rate regime under which exporters sold their earnings in a
regulated market separate from the inner China market (and thus allowing those exporters
to receive more RMB for a unit of foreign exchange than the inner market).' 7 In 1994,
China merged the dual-currency system and instituted a market-based managed floating
system. i s Every day, the PBC determined and announced the RMB exchange rate within
a 0.3% band around which the banks trade the RMB.19 This system remained in place
until the 1995 Asian financial crisis, when the PBC abandoned it in favor of a defacto peg
20
against the U.S. dollar.
2.

2005: From a De Facto Peg to a Crawling Peg

In July 2005, China replaced the de facto peg with a short-lived crawling peg. In addition to adopting the crawling peg, the PBC allowed a one-time revaluation of the RMB
from 8.28 to 8.11 RMB/US$ (i.e. 0.121 US$/RMB to 0.123 US$/RMB) (an appreciation
of 2.1%).21 Furthermore, the PBC linked the RMB exchange rate to a basket of currencies. 22 Under the new crawling peg, the RMB floated within a daily 0.3% band (later
15. See Min Zhao, External Liberalization and the Evolution of China's Exchange System: An EmpiricalApproach, at 10-18 (World Bank, China Office Research Paper No. 4, 2007), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSPfIB/2007/12/19/000020953_20071219140301/Rendered/PDF/
41856OCHAOLiberalizaionOWP401 PUBLIC 1.pdf [hereinafter External Liberalization].
16. See People's Bank of China, (adopted at the Third Session of the Eighth National People's Congress on
March 18, 1995, promulgated by Order No. 46 of the President of the People's Republic of China on March
18, 1995 and amended in accordance with the Decision on Amending the Law of the People's Republic of
China on the People's Bank of China adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth
National People's Congress on December 27, 2003), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/DAT/
214826.htm [Hereinafter P.R.C.]. See also Xinchen Sofia Lou, Challenging China's Fixed Exchange Rate Regime: An Analysis of U.S. Options, 28 HASTINGS LNTr'L & Comp. L. REv. 455, 457-58 (2005); Derek Scissors,
Deng Undone, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2009, at 24-39.
17. NAUGHTON, supra note 14.
18. External Liberalization, supra note 15, at 16.
19. Lou, supra note 16.
20. See External Liberalization, supra note 15, at 18. The de facto peg to the U.S. dollar has been subject to
heavy criticism in the U.S. See, e.g., Morici, supra note 3, at 5; Barry P. Bosworth, Valuing the Renminbi (The
Brookings Inst., Feb. 9, 2004), http://www.brooldngs.edu/papers/2004/0209macroeconomics_bosworth.
aspx.; John Cairns, China-They Haven't Just Repegged, IDEAGLOBAL, July 27, 2005, http://www.ideaglobal.
com/products/info/viewpdf.asp?id= %7BDB72DA59- 3DE6-4417-A522 -2810CA619BAC%7D; Virginie
Coudert & Cecile Couharde, Real Equilibrium Exchange Rate in China 6 (Centre D'Eades Prospectives et
D'Informations Internationals, Working Paper No. 2005-01, 2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/cii/
cepidt/2005-0l.htnl.; DOLLAR ADJUSTMENT: How FAR? AGAINST WHAT? 207 (C. Fred Bergsten & John
Williams eds., 2004).

21. The People's Bank of China, Public Announcement of the People's Bank of China on Reforming the
RMB Exchange Rate Regime (July 21, 2005), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=
6400&ID=542 [Hereinafter PBC]; Id..; Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 1.
22. PBC, supra note 21; Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 1.
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amended to 0.5%) which took as the central parity the previous working day's RMB ex23
change rate.
3. 2005 and Onwards: From a Crawling Peg to a Managed Float
The PBC, however, repealed the crawling peg after only seven days in favor of a managed float. 24 Under the managed float, the PBC determines the RMB exchange rate in
view of the exchange rates of a basket of currencies (consisting of the U.S. dollar, the yen,
the Euro, and a couple other currencies). 25 The managed float remains in operation and
the PBC retains the right to decide the timing and manner of any future RMB
revaluation.26
B.

CHINA'S POLICIES TO CONTROL THE

RMB

EXCHANGE RATE

China relies on two methods for maintaining the RMB exchange rate within the set
target. First, the PBC employs both domestic and international monetary measuressuch as through increasing the RMB supply by issuing RMB and decreasing foreign exchange supply by purchasing foreign currency-in order to accumulate a large amount of
foreign reserves and at the same time counter the appreciative pressure on the RMB. 27
Second, China employs strict capital controls to ensure that the adjustment of RMB supply effectively maintains a specified level of RMB exchange. 28 Despite these controls, the
RMB has been fully convertible "for purposes of trade in goods and services" since China
adopted Article VIII of the IMF Articles in 1996.29
Under the Administrative Rules of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Control in 1996 (1996 Rules), China-based organizations were required to remit
any foreign exchange earnings back to China and deposit such earnings in authorized
23. PBC, supra note 21; Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 1.
24. The PBC adopted a crawling peg onJuly 21, 2005, and abandoned it in favor of a managed float on July
27, 2005. J JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CHINA'S CURRENCY: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF U.S. OIFIONS, RS22338,
CRS Report, at CRS-4 (2005), availableat http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57797.pdf.
25. Id. Morrison and Labonte define China's managed float in which "market forces are determining the
general direction of the [currency's] movement, but the government is retarding its rate of appreciation
through market intervention." Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 1.
26. See P.R.C., supra note 16.
27. See generally Morrison & Labonte, spra note 3, at 4. Mussa also suggests that China steers and controls the exchange rate heavily by purchasing foreign currency; in fact, Mussa claims that China counteracted
appreciative pressure on the RMB by purchasing as much as US$1 trillion worth of foreign currency between
2002 and 2007. See Michael Mussa, IMF Surveillance Over China's Exchange Rate Policy, 3 (Peterson Inst. for
Int'l Econ., Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/mussal007.pdf.
28. Paul V. Sharobeem, Biting the Hand That Feeds Us: A CriticalAnalysis of U.S. Policy Trends Concerning
Chinese Currency Manipulation, 19 FLA. J.IN! -'L
L. 697, 698 (2007). Before 1994, China controlled all crossborder flow of the RMB and foreign currency through mandatory plans and directives. The PBC was the
sole trader of the RMB, to which foreign exchange receipts must be traded. The PBC also made all foreign
exchange payments. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 13.
29. See Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, People's Republic of China Accepts Article VIII Obligations,
No. 96/58 (Dec. 4, 1996), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1996/pr9658.htm. Enterprises
may exchange the RMB for foreign currencies subject to examination to ensure the underlying transactions
are genuine and legally valid. See Christopher H. Stephens, Policy Collisions-China'sBanking Reforms Require
Dramatic Changes Affecting Many Policies and Sectors, 120 BANKING L. J. 34, 39-40 (2003).
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foreign exchange banks. 30 Thus, in this regard, both enterprises and individuals were sub3
ject to the rules that govern the conversion of RMB into foreign currencies. '
The 1996 Rules were modified by State Council Order No. 532 in August 2008,
through the introduction of the Administrative Rules of the People's Republic of China
on Foreign Exchange Control (2008 Rules), 32 which aims to achieve balanced regulation
on "the inflow and outflow of foreign exchange." 33 The 2008 Rules relax some of the
regulations on RMB outflow and broaden the channels through which capital can be
transferred abroad. For example, subject to certain terms and conditions, China-based
organizations or individuals are no longer required to remit their foreign earnings to
3
China. 4
At the same time, the 2008 Rules tighten the regulations on RMB inflow by strengthen' 35
ing the supervision of the underlying transactions to prevent the inflow of "hot money.
Furthermore, foreign exchange remitted into China undcr capital account remains subject
to stringent controls; for example, use of the exchange and RMB proceeds are restricted

and exchange inflow is subject to regulatory authority approval. 36 The supervising authority is also entitled to supervise and examine the use of foreign exchange entering into

China under such channels. 37 Therefore, although the RMB is fully convertible under the
current account, strict capital controls remain in place.
C. RMB

VALUATION

1. RMB Exchange Rate Movement
Figure 1 shows the nominal RMB exchange rate over the period from 1970 to 2008
while figure 2 illustrates the nominal and real exchange rates of the RMB between 1986
and 2008 with the exchange rate expressed in terms of U.S. dollars per RMB in both
figures. The higher the exchange rate, the more valuable the RMB is in terms of U.S.
dollars. Therefore, a decreasing exchange rate indicates a depreciation of the RMB, while
an increasing exchange rate signals an appreciation of the RMB. Figure 3 demonstrates
the nominal exchange rate index and the real effective exchange rate index of the RMB
30. For analysis, see Lou, snpra note 16, at 458.
31. See id.
32. The 2008 Rules were promulgated as the No. 193 order of the State Council of the People's Republic
of China on Jan.29, 1996, and were amended according to the Decision of the State Council on Amending
the Foreign Exchange Control Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Jan.14, 1997. They were
re-amended and passed in the 20th executive meeting of the State Council on Aug.i, 2008. See generally
Foreign Exchange Control Regulations of the People's Republic of China (Amended in 2008) available at
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2008-08-05/58193.shtml [hereinafter Amended Foreign Exchange Control Regulations].
33. Amended Foreign Exchange Control Regulations, supra note 32, arts. 1, 6, and 11; For analysis, see
King & Wood, Revolution in the Foreign Exchange Control System-a Brief Analysis on the New Administrative
Rules on Foreign Exchanges (Aug. 15, 2008), available at http://www.kingandwood.com/en/article/revolutionin-chinas-foreign-exchange-control- 10-china-bulletin-2009.
34. Amended Foreign Exchange Control Regulations, supra note 32, at art. 9; see also King & Wood, supra
note 32.
35. Amended Foreign Exchange Control Regulations, supra note 32, at arts. 7, 12 and 15; see also, King &
Wood, supranote 33.
36. Amended Foreign Exchange Control Regulations, supra note 32, arts. 21-23; see also id. arts. 16-20
(relating to transactions under the current account).
37. Id. arts. 33-37.
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between 1979 and 2008, with the index in the year 2000 as 100. The exchange rate index
reflects the value of the RMB in terms of a basket of currencies. A falling index number
represents a depreciation of the RMB while a rising index number represents an
appreciation.
All three figures demonstrate that the RMB's value in terms of foreign currencies dramatically decreased through the 1980s to 1994. After 1994, however, the exchange rate
became relatively stable. Moreover, the RMB's nominal exchange rate shows a slight appreciative trend since 2006.

Figure 1: The Nominal Exchange Rates of the RMB Between 1970 and 2008
0.6

S0.4

S0.3

70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
Nominal exchange rate
Sources: constructed by C. Leung using the monthly nominal exchange rates obtained from the database of
the International Momentary Fund.

Figure 2: The Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates of the RMB
Between 1986 and 2008

:f
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5 0.2
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exchange rate
Sources: constructed by C. Leung using (1) the nominal exchange rate obtained from the database of the
International Monetary Fund; (2) the U.S. consumer price index obtained from the database of the International Monetary Fund; and (3) China consumer price index obtained from the database of the China Data
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Notes: (i) The exchange rate index is a geometric average of exchange rates for the RMB of certain countries
selected by the IMF.
adjusts the nominal effective exchange rate for the price movements in
(ii), The real effective exchange rate
38
China and the selected countries.

Figure 3: The RMB's Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices
(Year 2000-100) Between December 1979 and 2008
400

m 300
si250
200
150
100

50
0
79 31 32 83 84 35 86 37 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 03

year
-Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
-Real
Effective Exchange Rate
Sources: constructed by C. Leung using the nominal and real effective exchange rate indices obtained from
the database of the International Momentary Fund.

2.

RMB Misalignment

Despite not formally announcing an RMB revaluation, China has allowed the nominal
value of the RMB to appreciate against the U.S. dollar by 3.1% in 2006, 5.8% in 2007,
and 7.2% in 2008; 39 in total, the RMB has appreciated 18.7% from July 21, 2005, to April
13, 2009.40 It should be noted, however, that many other currencies have appreciated
more substantially against the U.S. dollar in this timeframe. Consequently, some have
argued that the relative lower appreciation of the RMB against the U.S. dollar is an effec41
tive depreciation of the RMB.
42
The exSeveral prominent economists contend that the RMB remains undervalued.
tent of undervaluation against the U.S. dollar generally ranges from fifteen percent to
sixty percent, depending upon the organization or economist conducting the research and

38. IMF, "International Financial Statistics: Exchange Rates and Exchange Rate Arrangements" available
at http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/IFSExcha.htm.

39. These figures are calculated by C. Leung using data obtained from the IMF database.
40. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 1.
41. See Mussa, supra note 27, at 3.
42. See, e.g., Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3; Dani Rodrik, The Real Exchange Rate and Economic
Growth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/rodrick.pdf;
Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie Chinn & Eiji Fujii, The Overvaluation of Renminbi Undervaluation, 26(5) J. or
INT'L MONEY AND FIN. 762 (2007); Jeffrey A. Fankel & Shang-Jin Wei, Assessing China's Exchange Rate
Regime, 22 EcoN. POL'Y 575-627 (2007); Andrew Stoeckel & WarwickJ. McKibbin, Chinese CurrencyRevaluFALL 2009
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the calculation method utilized, 4 3 while the undervaluation against the Euro is estimated
at approximately twenty-five percent. 44 On the other hand, IMF research allows for the
45
possibility that the RMB is not undervalued.
Thus, despite a constant stream of commentators labeling the Chinese currency undervalued, a consensus has not emerged as to the extent of RMB undervaluation. 4 6 The
reason for the continuing uncertainty is clear: estimators adopt different economic fimctions and methodologies to obtain the estimates. Different estimation methods are subject to different assumptions and measurement uncertainties. 4 7 Consequently, no
estimation method can authoritatively conclude that the RMB is misaligned (not to mention precisely stating the extent of misalignment).

ation, ECON. ScENARIos (Ctr. for Int'l Econs. & McKibben Software Group Pry Ltd., 2005), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Fies/rc/articles/2005/06globaleconomics mckibbin/20050610.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Morrison & Labonte, supra
note 3; Rodrik, supra
note 42, at 1; Cheung, supra
note 42, at 76;
Fankel, supra note 42, at 575-627; Stoeckel, supra note 42.
44. See David Lague, China Rejects Europe's Callfor Currency to Rise Faster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.co n/2007/11/28/business/worldbusiness/28yuan.html?scp=5&sq=currency,
%20china&st=cse.
45. But see Mussa, supra note 27, at 4, 114 (citing a paper prepared by the IMF Asian and Pacific Department (APD) estimating that the present undervaluation of the yuan is somewhere between zero and thirtyfive percent). On the other hand, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the managing director of the IMF, recently
stated that it was "common knowledge" that the RMB is undervalued. Burger-thy-neighbourpolicies, EcoNoMIST, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/finane/displaystory.cfrn?story-id=13059709.
Strauss-Kahn also said the RMB was "significantly undervalued" in April 2009. Lesley Wroughton, IMF says
China currency significantly undervalued, REUTERS, Apr. 16, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
usDollarRpt/idUSWAT01129420090416; see also Steven Dunaway, Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF Surveillance Over China'sExchange Rate: Comments on a Paperby MichaelMussa, Presentation at
the Peterson Inst. Conference on China's Exchange Rate Policy (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://
www.petersoninstimte.org/publications/papers/dunaway-on-mussal007.pdf. For others doubting the undervaluation of the RMS, see Burger-thy-neighbour Policies, EcONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://
www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?storyid=13059709; Yin Wong Cheung, Menzie Chinn & Eiji
Fujii, China'sCurrentAccount and Exchange Rate, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14673,
2009) (concluding that the RMB was only ten percent undervalued in 2006-given the RMBs appreciation
since 2006 the RMB may no longer be undervalued according to the Cheung, Chinn and Fujii thesis); see
generally Jiawen Yang & Isabella Bajeux-Besnainon, Is the Chinese Currency Undervalued?, 2 INT'L RrS. J. OF
FIN. & ECON. 106 (2006).
46. See Sharobeem, supra
note 28, at 704, 718 (citing Ernest Preeg of the Manufacturer's Alliance estimating the undervaluation to be between fifteen and twenty-five percent; Goldman Sachs Economic Research
Group estimating undervaluation at 9.5 to 15%l);
The Economist is estimating a fifty-eight percent undervalation (albeit using the Big Mac Index); and certain U.S. senators estimating undervaluation by 27.5% on
average).
47. For this reason, although it is widely known that IMF staff have privately stated to China that its
currency is misaligned, due to the "limitations in current methodologies used for quantitative real exchange
rate assessments" and "questions regarding the robustness of...the wide range of estimates of the undervaluation of the Chinese currency" IMF staff have "refrained from providing specific quantitative estimates of real
exchange rate misalignment". Int'l Monetary Fund, Treatment of Exchange Rate Issues in Bilateral Surveillance-A Stocktaking, (Aug. 30, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/083006.pdf;
see also Ionna Ciobdnau & Erik Denters, Manipulation of The Chinese Yuan-May fl/TO Members Respond?, 9
GRIFFIN'S VIEW ON INT'L AND COMp. LAW 56 n.1 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfmu?abstract_id=l 315290.
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3. China's Exchange Regime: The Criticisms
Regardless of the true value of the RMB, the RMB exchange rate constitutes one of the
most fiercely debated issues involving China and its trading partners. What lies behind
this pressure on China to revalue its currency?
The main reason why the international community is concerned with China's exchange
regime is China's continued accumulation of foreign reserves and expansion of its trade
surplus.4 8 Figure 4 shows China's foreign reserves between 1977 and 2006. Two trends
emerge: first, China's foreign reserves have steadily increased since 1994; and second, the
rate of the increase has risen since 2001. Figure 5 illustrates China's current account
balance between 1970 and 2007. It shows that China has maintained a trade surplus since
1994 and that the surplus increased dramatically between 2004 and 2007.

Figure 4: China's Foreign Reserves Between 1977 and 2006
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Sources: constructed by C. Leung using China's foreign reserves data obtained from the database of Glofbal
Development Finance.
Such an exponentially increasing trade surplus is likely the main factor in the United
States' dissentient sentiments and general uneasiness with China's trade policies. Over the
past few years, the United States has become increasingly exasperated by its increasing
trade deficit with China in the face of a significant rise in the U.S. unemployment rate and
corresponding shrinkage of the domestic manufacturing industry. 49 Figure 6 shows the
U.S. imports and exports to and from China between 1972 and 2008. Although both are
increasing, the growth rate of exports is greater than that of imports. This growth can be
48. See generally L. Josh Bivens & Robert E. Scott, China Manipulates Its Curreny-A Response is Needed
(Econ. Pol'y Inst., Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/pml16/; Morrison &
Labonte, supra note 3, at 1(quoting China's foreign exchange reserves at $1.95 trillion as of March, 2009, up
from $403 billion in 2003 and China's trade surplus with the world at $297 billion in 2008).
49. See, e.g., Jeannine Aversa, Rising Unemployment Spares No State in December, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 27,
2009, available at http://www.blnz.com/news/2009/01/27/Indiana South Carolina unemployment rate_
5251.html. For exact statistics, see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/. For statistics on
manufacturing, see http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag31-33.htm.
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Figure 5: China's Current Account Balance Between 1970 and 2007
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Sources: constructed by C. Leung using the yearly imports and exports data obtained from the database of
China Data.

seen in figure 7, which illustrates the United States' current account with China and
reveals that the U.S. trade deficit with China has been growing at an increasing rate. In
fact, not only is China's contribution to the U.S. trade deficit increasing, but it is also the
most significant factor in the United States' growing deficits with Asia and the world (i.e.
its overall trade deficit). This trend can be seen from figures 8 and 9, which show China's
contribution to the United States' current account deficit with Asia and the world,
respectively.

HI.

China's Exchange Rate Policy: Is It Consistent with the International

Legal Framework?
A.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

General international law recognizes a state's freedom to issue currency and inherent
50
As an inherently sovereign act,
sovereignty to determine the value of that currency.
exchange control or currency regulation is a domestic measure, which is encompassed in a
51
China (and indeed, any country) is free to impose whatever
state's domestic jurisdiction.
exchange rate policy to the exclusion of any state scrutiny. Indeed, this situation is what
the Chinese authorities have traditionally maintained when pressured to revalue the
RMB.52
50. AsIF H. QuREsmn & ANDREAS ZIEGLER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 156 (London, Sweet &
Maxwell 2007).
51. See Charles Proctor, USA v China and the Revalnation of the Renminbi: Exchange Rate Pegs and International Law, EUR. Bus. L. REV. 1333, 1336(2006).
52. See Mure Dickie, CnrrencyReform Seen as a Question of Sovereignty, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2005, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f4e386c2-fa4e-Ild9-b092-OOOOOe2511c8.html?nclick-check=1; Mussa, supra
note 27, at 8.
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Figure 6: The U.S. Exports and Imports to and from China Between 1972
and 2008
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Sources: constructed by C. Leung using the quarterly U.S. imports and exports data obtained from the
database of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Several economists, however, disagree with these sentiments. For instance, Mussa calls
the argument "nonsense" based on what he sees as the "logical absurdity" of the national
sovereignty argument.5 3 Mussa's argument is that because the exchange rate is the value
of one currency against another currency, it is logically impossible for two countries to
maintain conflicting exchange rates with respect to the other's currency, and therefore it is
"nonsense" to suggest each of them has a sovereign right to determine its exchange rate.54
In our view, however, Mussa confuses the "right" with the "manifestation" of the right.
The mere fact that a person's right conflicts with another's right does not necessarily
deprive both persons of their respective rights. 55 Similar logic applies to rights of nations.
The impossibility for both nations to achieve their respective desirable exchange rate may
imply either that the countries at issue do not exchange currency or that both countries
compromise to agree on an exchange rate. Such practical limitations by themselves, however, are insufficient to negate the existence of the state's fundamental right to determine
its currency.
Given its inherent sovereign right to determine its currency, China's exchange rate policy infringes on no general international law. China can therefore adopt whatever ex53. Mussa, supra note 27, at 8.
54. Id.

55. An example can be found in family law. Although only one parent would obtain the right of custody to
a divorcing couple's only child, this fact does not deprive both parents of their right to be the child's custo-

dian. See ATHENA NGA CHEE Liu, FAMILY LAW FOR THE HONG KONG SAR 217-235 (Hong Kong, Hong
Kong University Press 1999).
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Figure 7: The U.S. Current Account with China Between 1972 and 2008
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Sources: constructed by C. Leung using the quarterly U.S. imports and exports data obtained from the
database of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

change rate regime it deems to be in its best interests regardless of the impact on other
nations. China is a signatory, however, to a number of international agreements that
modify its traditional position in relation to exchange rate policy. The following two
sections examine the legitimacy of China's exchange rate under the IMF Articles and the
WTO, respectively.
B.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Drafted at Bretton Woods in recognition that the exchange rates and currency value of
one country can drastically affect the interests of other countries, the IMF Articles are
56
now the most important element of international monetary law and practices. Together
57
Articles.
IMF
the
with
comply
must
China
with the other 185 members of the IMF,
56. The IMF was established in large part to prevent the competitive devaluations so common in the Great
Depression. As originally negotiated, the IMF Articles obliged members to maintain a system of fixed exchange rates based upon gold (the so-called 'gold standard' or 'par value' system). This system lasted until
1971, when U.S. President Richard Nixon announced that the United States would allow the market to
determine the comparative value of currency. For information on the founding and development of the IMF,
see J. KEITH HORSEFIELD & MARGARET GARRiTSEN DE VRIES, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
1945-1965 vol. 1 89-118 (1969). For more on the role of the IMF, see Martin A. Weiss, The Global Financial
Crisis: The Role of the IMF, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 1 (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http://opencrs.com/document/RS22976; see also JosEPH GOLD, LEGAL AND INST5TUT5ONAL ASPECTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS (1984); JOSEPH GOLD, INTERPRETATION:
THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).

57. IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power & IMF Board of Governors, (2009), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#total. China has been a member of the IMF since its
establishment in 1945. See At a Glance-China and the IMF, Sept. 1, 2004, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/country/chn/rr/glance.htm.
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Figure 8: China's Contribution to the U.S. Current Account Balance with
Asia
80
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-2v
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Sources: constructed by C. Leung using the quarterly U.S. imports and exports data obtained from the
database of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Notes: the U.S. runs a current account deficit with Asia throughout the whole period except for the third
session in 1975. Therefore a positive percentage represents China's contribution to the U.S. trade deficit
except for the third session in 1975.

This section analyzes the legality of China's exchange rate policies with the IMF Articles. 58 The section proceeds in four parts, discussing: (1) the exchange arrangement obligations required under Article IV; (2) whether China's exchange rate regime is an
unlawful exchange arrangement; (3) whether China's exchange rate policy is compatible
with the undertakings listed in Article TV(1); and (4) whether China's exchange regime
59
complies with the foreign exchange transaction obligations under Article VIII.
1. Exchange Arrangement Obligations
In 1978, the Second Amendment-which marked the end of the par value systemincorporated the current version of Article IV into the IMF Articles. 60 The amended
version of Article IV reflects a shift in objective from achieving a stable exchange rate to
61
achieving a stable exchange rate system.
58. It should also be noted at this point that the IMF has never demonstrated that a country has manipulated its exchange rate so as to breach the IMF Articles.
59. This section is limited to evaluating the compatibility of China's exchange rate regime under the IMF
Articles. It does not discuss the procedural and enforcement problems associated with the IMF. For a discussion of those matters, see Robert W. Staiger & Alan 0. Sykes, 'Currency Manipulation' and World Trade 27-28
(Stanford L. School, Working Paper No. 363, 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1151942 (stating the
IMF's "emphasis on non-confrontational consensus building" and "the absence of credible sanctions for disregarding IMF advice" contribute to the conclusion that the IMF "[cannot] do much to influence the behavior of a member such as China"). See also Subramanian and Mattoo, supra note 10, at 5-8.
60. IMF Article TV Overview, supra note 1, at 1.
61. Id. at 2; See also Raj 3hala, Virtues, the Chinese Yuan, and the American Trade Empire, 38 HONG KONG L.
J. 183, 222 (2008) [hereinafter Virtues and Trade]. For a brief but useful description of how the end of the par
value system and corresponding amendment dramatically shifted the role of the IMF, see K Subramanian,
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Figure 9: China's Contribution to the U.S. Current Account Balance with
the World
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Sources: constructed by C. Leung using the U.S. imports and exports data obtained from the database of
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Notes: the U.S. runs a current account deficit with the world throughtout the whole period except for the
third session in 1975. Therefore a positive percentage represents China's contribution to the U.S. trade
deficit, whilst a negative percentage indicates that the U.S. ran a trade account surplus with China during that
period.
a.

Article IV(l)
Article

V(1) describes the general obligations of members with regards to their ex-

change arrangements. Section 1 can be regarded as consisting of three parts, namely the
62
(1) preamble, (2) general obligations, and (3) four specific obligations.
The preamble to Article V(1) provides: "(1) the purpose of the international monetary
system is to provide a framework that (a) facilitates the exchange of goods, services and
capital among countries and (b) sustains sound economic growth;" and (2) the international monetary system's "principle objective is the continuing development of the orderly
63
Although
underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability."
the preamble contains no direct obligations, it serves to assist the interpretation of member obligations under Section 1.64

The IMFs New Mandate, HrNDu BusiNEss LiNE, Oct. 20, 2007, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/l0/20/stories/2007102050720800.htm.
62. IMF Article lV Overview, supra note 1, at 7.
63. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aalaa04.htm (last
visited Aug. 8, 2009). This premise rests upon the assumption that members' observance of the Article 1V's
obligations enhances the effective functioning of the international monetary system, which in turn facilitates
trade and promotes financial and economic stability. See IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 8. Thus,
the primary goal is not the upholding of a specified system, but the achievement of broader economic benefits. Any rules governing members' monetary policy are means to an end rather than an end in itself. The
regulating monetary conduct are means to achieve the broader economic objective. See Proctor, supra
rules
note 51, at 1338.
64. IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 8.
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Thus, each IMF member undertakes general obligations to collaborate with the IMF
and other members to "(1) assure orderly exchange arrangements and (2) promote a stable
system of exchange rates." 65 Although it is relatively clear that the collaboration concerns
the two aspects mentioned above, the obligation to collaborate remains vague as to the
66
degree of collaboration necessary to satisfy the general obligations.
Article IV(l) sets out the specific member obligations:
(i) Endeavour to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of
fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its circumstances;
(ii)

Seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic
disruptions;

(iii) Avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members; and
(iv)

b.

Follow exchange rate policies compatible with the undertakings under this
67
Section.

Article IV(2)

Article IV(2), entitled "general exchange arrangements" contains three main provisions.
Section 2(a) requires members to notify the IMF of its choice and any change in such
choice of the exchange arrangement which the member intends to apply "in fulfillment of
[the member's] obligations under [Article IV(1)]."68 Section 2(b) addresses the possible
form of exchange arrangement under the international monetary system that prevailed at
the time of drafting the Second Amendment. The possible exchange arrangements are:
(i) the maintenance by a member of a value for its currency in terms of the special
drawing right or another denominator, other than gold, selected by the member; or
(ii) cooperative arrangements by which members maintain the value of their currencies in relation to the value of the currency or currencies of other members; or (iii)
69
other exchange arrangements of a member's choice.
Section 2(c) provides for a mechanism under which the IMF may make further provisions with respect to members' exchange arrangements upon the concurrence of eightyfive percent of the majority of the voting power. 70 This provision, however, cannot restrict a member's freedom to choose their exchange arrangements so long as such arrangements are consistent with the IMF's purposes and the obligations under Article IV(l).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
See Mussa, stpra note 27, at 9.
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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c. Article IV(3)
Article TV(3) provides an oversight function to the Fund. The provision first states that
the Fund "shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective
operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under
Section 1 of [Article V]."71 The provision then provides that such oversight shall be
affected through "firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members" and
through the adoption of "specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect
to those policies."72
The oversight described above is referred to as "bilateral surveillance." In practice,
bilateral surveillance involves an IMF staff assessment of a member's policies (which could
include the finding that a fundamental misalignment exists) followed by consultations between the IMF and the member. 73 In order to conduct the bilateral surveillance, members
are obligated under Article LV(3)(b) to "provide the Fund with the information necessary
for such surveillance, and, when requested by the Fund, [to] consult with it on the mem74
ber's exchange rate policies."
Another key factor in the surveillance function is the Executive Board's 1977 Decision,
"Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies" (as amended), 75 that sets out the "principles
and procedures" applying to all members "whatever their exchange rate arrangements and
whatever their balance of payments position." 76 In terms of guidance for exchange policies, the principles merely reiterate the aims of IMF Article IV by stating:
A. A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an
unfair competitive advantage over other members.
B. A member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary to counter disorderly conditions, which may be characterized inter alia by disruptive short-term
movements in the exchange value of its currency.

C. Members should take into account in their intervention policies the interests of
other members, including those of the countries in whose currencies they intervene. 77
The 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance (Decision) repeats the first three principles
and adds a fourth:
D. A member should avoid exchange rate policies that result in external
78
instability.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See IMF, Treatment of Exchange Rate Issues in Bilateral Surveillance-A Stocktaking (Aug. 30, 2006),
available at www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/083006.pdf.
74. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, sitpra note 63.
75. Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies, Decision No. 5392-(77/63), Apr. 29, 1977 (as amended by
Decision Nos. 8564-(87/59), Apr. 1, 1987, 856-(88/64), Apr. 22, 1988, and 10950-(95/37), Apr. 10, 1995),
available at http://www.imf.org/externallpubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=5392-(77/63) [hereinafter Surveillance
over Exchange Rate Policies, Decision No. 5392-(77/63)].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Press Release, IMF, IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral Surveillance Over
Members' Policies (une 21, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm.
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Another aspect of the Decision worth noting is Part 2, entitled "Principles for the Gui-

dance of Members' Policies Under Article IV, Section 1," provides that the Fund "shall
consider the following developments as among those which would indicate the need for
discussion with a member... (i) protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the
exchange market." 79 Interestingly, the Decision substitutes the word "would" for the
word "might" that existed in the 1977-1995 version.8 0 An important limitation of the
Decision, however, is that while it creates a duty to consult with and listen to the Fund, it
cannot create any legal obligation that does not exist in the IMF Articles.
2.

Is China's Peg as an Exchange Arrangement in Itself Unlawful?

Exchange arrangement refers to the method a member adopts to determine the value of
81
its currency. Considering that Article V(2)(b)(i) states that "exchange arrangement may
include... the maintenance by a member of a value for its currency in terms of the special
drawing right or another denominator, other than gold, selected by the member," it is
reasonable to conclude that Article IV permits pegging to a specific currency or a basket

of currencies.8 2 On its face, Article IV(2)(b)(i) expressly prohibits pegging to gold but
allows members to maintain currency value by reference to "another denominator."8 3 Because Section (b)(i) does not qualify the term "another denominator" (other than gold),
value can presumably take the form of other currencies.
Even if Article IV(2)(b)(i) fails to provide the basis for the legitimacy of a peg, Article
IV(2)(b)(iii) expressly recognizes "other exchange arrangements of a member's choice" as

an accepted form of exchange arrangements. 84 Article IV(2)(b)(iii) therefore seems to
confirm a member's freedom to choose its exchange rate regime. 85 This freedom is subject only to the procedural requirements to inform the IMF of its choice and the requires
ment that the arrangement should fulfill the members' obligations under Article TV(l). 6
The relevancy of Article TV(I) is evident from Section 2(a) which qualifies the exchange
arrangement with the phrase "in fulfillment of [the member's] obligations under Section 1
7
of [Article V]."8
Based upon a textual interpretation of Article IV(2), China's current managed flow that
pegs the RMB against a basket of currency is not in itself unlawful under the IMF Articles,
subject to the requirement that the managed flow complies with China's obligations under
Article IV(l). Observance of the obligations set out in Section 1 should be the only re79. Id. China criticized the adoption of this fourth principle. See Chee Yoke Ling & Celine Tan, China
Criticizes IMF Decision on Exchange-Rate Surveillance, TitlRD WORLD NETWORK, July 3, 2007, available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/finance/twninfofinance070701 .htm.
80. See Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies, Decision No. 5392-(77/63), supra note 75.
81. IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 1.
82. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 63.
83. See Proctor, supra note 51, at 1339.
84. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 63.
85. See IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 4; Mussa, supra note 6, at 9.
86. See LIMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 1; see also, Mussa, supra note 2727, at 9; Proctor, supra
note 51, at 1339.
87. See also IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at § 2(c), which (subject to an eighty-five percent
majority of the total voting power) empowers the Fund to make provision for general exchange arrangements
"without limiting the right of members to have exchange arrangements of their choice consistent with the
purposes of the Fund and the obligations under Section 1 of this Article."
FALL 2009

1276

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

striction on the member's freedom to choose an exchange arrangement. A member
should not be deprived of such freedom simply because most other members (or indeed,
most of its trading partners) have adopted some particular form of exchange arrangement.
Therefore, although most of China's major trading partners have adopted a floating exchange rate regime, these trading partners cannot deprive China of its freedom simply
because the global trend favors a floating exchange arrangement (or indeed for any
reason).
3. Does China's Exchange Arrangement Violate Article IV(1)?
Having established that China's current exchange arrangement is not per se inconsis-

tent with Article IV of the IMF Articles, we must now determine whether China's exchange arrangement fulfills its obligations under Article IV(l). In this regard, much of the
criticism directed towards China's exchange rate regime revolves around Article
IV(1)(iii).88 The relevant question under Article IV(1)(iii) is whether China's exchange
rate policy is compatible with the undertakings listed in Section 1.

a. Compliance with Article IV(1)(iii)
While much of Article IV(1) is hortatory in nature, Article JV(1)(iii) provides positive
duties to member states: members shall "avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or
to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members."8 9
Article IV(1)(iii) thus implies that the only impermissible type of manipulation of exchange rate or the international monetary system under the provision is the one that purports to "prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members." 90 Under such an interpretation, a member
would not violate Article IV if it manipulated its exchange rate in furtherance of its obligations under Article IV, or indeed for other purposes so long as the purposes are consistent
with their Article IV obligations (i.e. the manipulation is not instituted or maintained in
order to "prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members"). 91
China's compliance with Article IV(1)(iii) therefore depends on the answers to the following two questions: (1) does China manipulate its exchange rate or the international
monetary system, and (2) if so, is the "manipulation" done in order to "prevent effective
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other
members." 92 Unfortunately, the articles do not define the terms "manipulation" or "unfair competitive advantage" and therefore the meaning of both terms are in dispute.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See, e.g., Mussa, supra note 27, at 10.
IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 63, at art. IV.
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Manipulation

The question of whether China manipulates its currency is subject to much discussion
93
Some take a narrow approach to the question and argue that the word
and debate.
"manipulate" implies change, and hence China could not have "manipulated" its currency
94
Others suggest that curbecause the value of its currency remains virtually unchanged.
rency manipulation can be evidenced by the setting of an exchange rate that is too low,
which necessitates a "protracted large-scale intervention in one direction" in the exchange
market. 9 5 Advocates of the latter approach contend that China manipulates its currency
96
through its accumulation of enormous foreign reserves, which they claim evidences a
protracted, large scale, and one-way intervention to prevent appreciation. Such an intervention to counteract appreciation, however, at most suggests a high possibility of exrate inialignment the mere finding of exchange rate miaiignment is insufficient
changed
97
Moreover, it would be grossly
to establish that a country has manipulated its currency.
unfair to conclude that a country has manipulated its currency based solely on the amount
98
of its foreign reserves.
According to the IMF Legal Department, there are many different ways through which
a member can be seen as "manipulating" its exchange rate under Section l(iii), including
excess intervention in exchange markets or through the imposition of capital controls (re99
gardless of whether the official intervention results in movement of the exchange rate).
Manipulation can therefore occur through a set of monetary, fiscal, or trade policies that
1 00
influence the exchange rate.
Indeed, under such a definition, the scope of exchange rate manipulation is so wide that
10 1
With manipuvirtually every country can be said to be manipulating its exchange rates.

93. See Lou, supra note 16, at 477 (stating that the lack of precedence on Article IV renders the criteria of
"manipulation" unclear).
94. See Mussa, supra note 27, at 11. Such contention, however, is untenable following the IMF Legal
Department's determination that manipulation may either promote or prevent exchange rate movement. See
IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 15.
95. M.R. Venkatesh, Yuan: the Hero Turns Villain, THE HINDU Bus. LINE, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://
www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/10/01/stories/2004100101960800.htm (inferring from the IMF Decision on Surveillance in 1977 over Exchange Rate Policies which indicated that a "protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market" identifies the circumstances under which the IMF needs to
speak with the authorities in order to find out their motivation Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies,
Decision No. 5392-(77/63), supra note 75, at I 15(i); IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 16.
96. Bivens & Scott, supra note 48.
97. Id.
98. See generally Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy in PETERSON INST. INT'L. EcON. 39 (Morris Goldstein & Nicholas Lardy eds., 2008) (discussing a similar view).
99. IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 15. See also Debating China's Exchange, supra note 98, at 40
(explaining that others are of the opinion that manipulation can assume the form of any set of macroeconomic
policies).
100. Mussa, supra note 27, at 12. See also Bivens & Scott, supra note 48; Albert Keidel, Morris Goldstein &
Desmond Lachman, Debate on China's RMB: Is it Seriously Under-Valued and Unfairly Manipulated (Dec.
8, 2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Transcript3.pdf (Keidel argues that the KVIB
is not unfairly manipulated because it is not seriously undervalued, whilst Goldstein maintains the opposite
positions).
101. Mussa, supra note 27, at 13.
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lation defined in such broad terms, China undoubtedly manipulates its exchange rate be02
cause it has implemented policies that affect the exchange rate.'
With the framework set out by the IMF Legal Department virtually unworkable, the
IMF Executive Board intervened to narrow the scope of manipulation under Section 1(iii)
to mean manipulation that both (1) targets at the level of an exchange rate, and (2) has an
effect on such level in the sense that the level moves or remains unchanged.103 Mussa
criticizes this interpretation as being too confined. According to Mussa, the IMF should
deem measures that display the following two features as manipulation: (1) the measure
affects the exchange rate or balance of payment, and (2) the measure's domestic objectives
could have been achieved by some other measure that did not affect the exchange rate or
the balance of payment.' 04 Under such an approach, it would be easier to establish that
countries-including China-use their exchange regime to manipulate currency. While
Mussa's proposal may have merit, it lacks textual support. Mussa's proposal would require
an amendment to the IMF Articles as they do not presently require countries to exhaust
all other means before resorting to exchange arrangement to achieve its domestic goals.
Simply stated, at present the exchange arrangement is legitimate, provided that it is compatible with the IMF Articles.
It is therefore clear that China's regime must, at this time, only be assessed under the
current IMF Articles and the definition of currency manipulation as set out by the IMF
Executive Board. In this regard, establishing that China's exchange regime targets at the
level of the exchange rate may not be difficult given that China maintains a currency peg.
As to the actual effect on the level of exchange rate, the RMB's strikingly stable exchange
rate following the adoption of a currency peg also makes it difficult to contend that
China's exchange regime does not affect the exchange rate level. Thus, under Article
1V(1)(iii), when analyzed under the definition set out by the Executive Board, China either
manipulates its exchange rate and/or the international monetary system.
ii.

With Forbidden Intent

Even upon a finding of manipulation of the exchange rate, a member only violates Section 1(iii) if it is shown to have manipulated its currency with forbidden intent; that is,
whether the manipulation occurred to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment
or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members. 105
Much like with the phrase "currency manipulation," the definitions of "unfair competitive advantage" and "forbidden intent" are contentiously debated. For instance, some take
102. The manipulation of the international monetary system is an aggregated form of exchange rate manipulation. Therefore, having found that China has likely manipulated its exchange rate, it is unnecessary for the
current discussion to determine whether China has manipulated the international monetary system.
103. IMF, Executive Board Decision, Bilateral Surveillance over Member's Policies, annex I 2(a), (June 15,
2007), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htn#decision (defining manipulation
as "policies that are targeted at-and actually affect-the level of an exchange rate") [hereinafter IMF Bilateral
Surveillance]; See IMF Bilateral Surveillance, at I 2(b) ("[A] member will only be considered to be manipulating exchange rates in order to gain an unfair advantage over other members if the Fund determines both that:
(A) the member is engaged in these policies for the purpose of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an undervalued exchange rate and (B) the purpose of securing such misalignment is to
increase net exports . . . ").
104. Mussa, supra note 27, at 13.
105. Mussa, supra note 27, at 13.
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a very narrow approach and argue that the requisite intention is satisfied only if the member confesses to have engaged in manipulating its exchange rate for a forbidden purpose.' 06 Under this interpretation, China would not be deemed to have the requisite
forbidden intent because the Chinese government has consistently maintained that the
purpose of its exchange regime is to enable the country to experience stable growth and to
protect the economy from instability flowing from its underdeveloped banking and financial system. 107 China has never professed or even hinted that it intends to use its exchange
regime to gain unfair advantage over other members or to prevent the adjustment of balance of payment.
The IMF Executive Board, however, rejects this narrow approach. In fact, the Executive Board has indicated that the Fund will make an independent assessment as to the
correctness of the member's representation. The Executive Board Decision of June 21,
2007 makes this clear: ". . . the Fund [must] make an objective assessment of whether a
member is observing its obligations under Article IV, Section 1 (iii), based on all available
0o
evidence, including consultation with the member concerned."'

The Executive Board also

stated that, "Any representation made by the member regarding the purpose of its policies
09
Thus, the Executive Board approach
will be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt."'
seems sensible, and for practical and political reasons, the IMF should refrain from taking
action in the face of ambiguous or unclear evidence regarding a member's intention in
implementing the scrutinized action.
Applying such an approach, it is difficult to envision China being found to violate Article IV(l)(iii). 110 In fact, it seems almost impossible to prove that China manipulates its
currency in order to achieve an unfair advantage that is "for the purpose" of creating
fundamental misalignment in the form of an undervalued exchange rate and in order to
secure an increase in exports, especially because intent must not only be proven as to both
factors and remembering that a member is to be given "the benefit of reasonable doubt" in
both determinations.
106. Id. at 11.
107. See, e.g., LEONG H. Lisw & HARRY X. Wu, TilE MAKING OF CHINA'S EXCiiANGF RATEr POLICY:
FROM PLAN To WTO ENrRY 212 (Edward Elgar, 2007) ("[Elxchange rate matters are considered in terms
of their impact upon not just the national economy but also domestic social stability, which has long been
among the most crucial of national priorities"). Id.; Matthew R. Leviton, Is it a Subsidy? An Evaluation of
China's Currency Regime and its Compliance with the WTO, 23 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 243, 260 (2006) (stating
China's position can be substantiated by the fact that economists believe China adopted the fixed exchange
rate in 1994 to control the inflation resulting from 1980s' expansive economic development and furthermore
that China's policies demonstrate its concern not only about the national economy but also about internal
social instability); Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 2 (stating Chinese officials arguments as fostering
economic stability and social stability, ensuring private enterprise stability in the face of significant marketoriented reforms, and protecting an underdeveloped and debt-laden banking system from speculative
pressures).
108. IMF Bilateral Surveillance, supra note 90, at $ 3 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Contra Proctor, sypra note 51, at 1344 (arguing that due to changing economic conditions, the peg has
become "plainly inappropriate", as demonstrated by China's "one-way" intervention (buying U.S. dollars).
This position, however, appears to ignore the textual wording of Article IV (1)(iii) and (2) as well as the
objectives as set out by Article IV(l). It therefore does not seem that such a position is sustainable in light of
the customary rules of treaty interpretation, as set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969), art. 31.
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To date, the IMF has never found China to be in breach of the provision against currency manipulation."' For that matter, even the U.S. Treasury has conceded that it cannot find any conclusive evidence of China's intent concerning its exchange rate regime."12
Moreover, several recent incidents also support the proposition that China does not have
the forbidden intention in maintaining its exchange regime. For instance, China's insistence on exchange rate stability despite the associated uncompetitive export position during the Asian financial crisis supports the proposition that it does not maintain its
exchange regime to gain unfair advantage over other members. 13 If China did manipulate its currency for the purpose of gaining advantage over other exporting countries, it
would have allowed its currency to devalue during the Asian financial crisis. 14 China's
refusal to devalue its currency demonstrates that it acted consistently with its professed
intention to ensure the economic stability of China. Finally, evidentiary data suggests that
China tends to use fiscal subsidies rather than exchange rate manipulation in order to
15
promote exports.'
Some commentators, however, argue that manipulation that has the effect of preventing
effective balance of payment should be found to violate Section 1(iii).116 This argument is
untenable due to the wording of Section l(iii) where the inclusion of the phrase "in order
to" suggests the requirement of intent." 7 The focus of the provision is therefore on the
intention rather than the impact of the impugned arrangement. If the focus of the IMF
Articles were meant to be on the effect of the exchange arrangement, the drafters could
have substituted "with the result of" in place of "for the purpose of."
That being said, China's exchange rate "manipulation" would not necessarily contravene Article IV(1)(iii) even under an "effect theory." In fact, whether China gains an
unfair advantage over other members from its exchange regime depends upon the definition of "unfair advantage." Reading the section in light of the background under which
the amended Article IV was drafted, "unfair advantage" refers to the advantage gained
from competitive depreciation.' Is Some commentators thus interpret "unfair advantage"
as the unjustifiably over-flourishing of exports or over-shrinking imports in light of either
Adam Smith's principle of absolute advantage or David Ricardo's principle of comparative
advantage. 19
XVhile it is difficult to simulate the "just" share of China's exports and import in the
imaginary world of Smith and Ricardo, the mere fact that China has adopted a currency
peg does not necessarily mean that its exports and imports must deviate from what the
Smith or Ricardo models envisage to an extent amounting to an "unfair disadvantage."
111. See Mussa, svpra note 27, at 11; Lou, supra note 16, at 477.
112. Mussa, supra note 27, at 11.
113. LIEW & Wu, supra note 107, at 212; Lou, supra note 16, at 478; It should also be noted that China's
exchange rate stability was "widely praised as a positive factor in helping to mitigate the economic consequences" of the Asian financial crisis; Proctor, supra note 51, at 1335.
114. Lou, supra note 16, at 478.
115. LiEw & Wu, supra note 107, at 92.
116. See, e.g., Proctor, supra note 51, at 1342 n. 41.

117. Mussa, supra note 27, at 12.
118. Virtues and Trade, supra note 61, at 222-23 (stating that the Second Amendment incorporates the
current Article IV into the IMF Articles in order to cure the problem of beggar-thy-neighbour competitive
devaluation policies (in order to increase exports) which were prevalent at that time).
119. Id. at 222.
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For example, the U.S. trade deficit with China might be perfectly explainable by the comparative advantage theory. 120 Moreover, a RMB revaluation will likely bring about minimal impact on the U.S. trade deficit for two interconnected reasons. First, more than half
of China's exports are produced by foreign-owned enterprises, 121 thus any advantage
gained by China through the cheaper exports is shared with foreign enterprises (no matter
how "unfair advantage" is defined). Second, China's export-oriented economy essentially
acts as a mere production platform because it relies upon the importation of necessary
inputs, materials, and components-in fact, China runs trade deficits with most East Asian
countries-and thus any revaluation will likely trigger the relocation of factories currendy
in China to another country (or simply redirect trade from China to another country that
has a comparative advantage over the United States.), rather than a shift of world demand
122
in favor of the U.S. good.
Second, China's exchange rate has not evidentially prevented the adjustment of the balance of payments. Market forces may contribute to the disequilibrium of the balance of
payment because the market is imperfect even when left undisturbed by the government. 2 3 The absence of absolute correlation or causation between a fixed exchange rate
arrangement and a favorable balance of payments is evident from the Japanese experience:
Japan's trade surplus did not significantly deteriorate after the revaluation of the Japanese
currency in the 1990s. 124 Thus, any failed adjustment of the balance of payment is not
necessarily the result of China's exchange rate manipulation.
Third, even if China's exchange regime might have delayed the balance of payment
adjustment, it would be inaccurate to assert that the regime prevents any adjustment. The
statistics clearly demonstrate that China's exchange regime is gradually evolving to facilitate moderate RMB appreciation. 25 Moreover, the promotion of equilibrium of balance
126
of payments is an explicit consideration of the exchange regime.
120. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 1 (the effect of the RMB's recent appreciation is unclear. For
instance, while Chinese exports to China grew by 5.1% in 2008 and 11.7% in 2007, American exports to
China grew by 9.5% in 2008 and 18.1% in 2007).
121. See Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 5; Xiaolian Hu, China'sApproach to Reform, 44 FIN. & DEV.
36, 37 (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/FANDD/2007/09/xiaolian.htm; Neil
C. Hughes, A Trade War with China, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 94, available at http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60825/neil-c-hughes/a-trade-war-with-china?; Lague, supra note 44; Invest
in China Investment Statistics, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Statistics/FDIStatistics/default.htm
(search by each respective year for "Express on Imports and Exports by FlEs") (last visited Aug. 08, 2009)
(citing data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Foreign-invested enterprises accounted for 54.42% of
total exports from China between January and April 2009. Their exports amounted to 55.34%, 57.10%,
58.24% and 58.29% of China's total exports in 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005 respectively).
122. See generally JOHN L. MANZELLA, GRASPLNG GLOBALIZATION: ITS LMPACT AND YOUR CORPORATE
RESPONSE 7-32 (2005); Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 5.
123. Mussa, supra note 27, at 37; see generally, Yuan step at a time, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2005, available at
http://s05.middlebury.edu/ECON034A/Yuan step at a time.pdf (stating that a large trade surplus does not
necessarily indicate an undervalued currency).
124. Lague, supra note 44.
125. JONATHON REUVID, THE HANDBOOK OF COUNTRY RISK 2008-2009: A GUIDE TO LNTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AND TRADE 236 (GMB Publishing 2008).
126. See Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Control (Promulgated as the
No.193 order of St. Council on Jan. 29, 1996, amended by St. Council on Jan. 14, 1997, effective Aug. 1,
2008) 2008 STANDING Comm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 211 (P.R.C.). See alsoVirtues and Trade, supra
note 61, at 204.
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Fourth, no country, including China, has a positive duty under the IMF Articles to
actively correct the balance of payment disequilibrium. Therefore, the mere disequilibrium of the balance of payment is not in itself evidence of China's breach of the IMF
Articles. Furthermore, the equilibrium of balance of payments does not necessarily equate
to the equalization of exports and imports. The equilibrium is determined by the demand
and supply of imports and exports. The balance of payments merely reflects the citizens'
choice of a combination of imported and exported goods. Therefore, the fact that the
balance of payments is negative or positive by itself does not evidence disequilibrium in
27
the balance of payments.
b. Compliance with Article IV(l) as a Whole
Section l(i) and Section I(ii)
require China to make its best efforts to (1) direct its
economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth
with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its circumstances; and (2) promote stability by fostering (i) orderly underlying economic and financial conditions; and (ii) a
monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions.
The use of prefatory words such as "endeavor to" and "seek to" indicates that these
subsections only impose a very limited legal obligation on members.' 28 Arguably, the
words are even hortatory in nature or even a mere declaration of intent. 29 Given the
wording, China satisfies these obligations provided its exchange regime purports to pursue
30
the provisions of the subsections.'
China's exchange regime assumes an important role in stabilizing the disruptions that
trade liberalization would otherwise bring to the country's underdeveloped financial system.'31 The regime imposes capital and currency controls in order to limit currency speculation and stabilize the banking system. 132 These controls have significantly contributed
to the absence of a banking or currency crisis in China, despite many uncured problems
within the financial system. 133 The regime thus enables the economy to grow steadily and
stably, which in turn assists economic growth and inflation avoidance. 34 Therefore, if
127. See, e.g., Yajie Wang, Hui Xiofeng & Abdol S. Soofi, EstimatingRenminbi (RMB) Equilibrium Exchange
Rate, 29J. POL'Y MODELING 417 (2007).

128. See Robert M. Barnett, Exchange Rate Arrangements In The InternationalMonetary Fund: The Fund as
Lawgiver, Adviser, and Enforcer, 7 TEmpIP. LNY'L & ComP. LJ.77, 79 (1993) (It is generally agreed Subsections
(i) and (ii) only impose an obligation of a "soft" nature). It is generally agreed Subsections (i) and (ii) only
impose an obligation of a "soft" nature. Id.; See also, Ross Leckow, The IMF and Crisis Prevention-The Legal
Frameworkfor Surveillance, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 285, 289 (2008) (stating that the Subsections only
require members to make their best efforts to satisfy the subsection).
129. Proctor, supra note 51, at 1338.
130. It should be noted, however, that it does not follow from the Subsections' soft nature that Subsections
(i) and (ii) are irrelevant to China's obligation under the IMF Articles. As Article IV(1)(iv) indicates, China's
exchange regime should entail exchange rate policies which follow China's Section 1 undertakings. Therefore, even if the China's regime as a whole is not obliged to actively pursue what Sections l(i) and (ii) provides, the exchange rate policies should not contravene the Section 1 undertakings even if the policies do not
have to actively facilitate the achievement of the undertakings.
131. Virtues and Trade, supra note 61, at 234.
132. BJoRN LOMBORG, GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTnONs 251 (Cambridge University Press 2004).
133. Id.; see Leckow, supra note 128, at 289 (claiming Chinese banks remain weak and troubled by the strong
growth of credit and non-performing loans).
134. Leviton, supra note 107, at 260.
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China's exchange regime amounts to economic or financial policy, then China satisfies the
obligation contained in Section 1(i) to direct its economic and financial policy to secure

orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, having due regard to China's
circumstances.

Furthermore, the exchange regime facilitates economic stability, which is particularly
important for the institutional reform transforming the economy towards a market-based

economy. The reform advances the legal and regulatory framework, improves the banking and financial system, and upgrades institutional capacity and capability.1 35 In other
words, the reform aims to foster the underlying economic and financial conditions. In
facilitating the necessary stability for the reform implementation, China's exchange regime also contributes to the development of these underlying economic and financial conditions. In this sense, China fulfills its Section I(ii) obligation.
indeed, China's exchange regime is not only in line with the country's Section I undertakings; it is also consistent with the general premise encompassed in the preamble to
Section 1. As explained in Section B(I) of this article, the preamble reveals that the ultimate aim of Section 1 is the achievement of the broader economic benefit which takes the
form of financial and economic stability.' 36 Therefore, if China's discontinuance of the
current exchange regime would disrupt financial and economic stability, China's maintenance of the regime would be consistent with the aim of Section 1. In this regard, some
economists predict that a sudden and large revaluation of the RMB would impose an
unbearable risk on China's immature and fragile financial system. 137 It would also incur
risk of social instability because a large RMB revaluation could result in high and sudden
unemployment. 138 China's exchange regime, which slowly and moderately revalues the
RMB, thus furthers the general aim of Section 1 as reflected in the preamble.

4. Does China's Exchange Regime Comply with its Obligations Relating to Foreign Exchange
Transactions Under Article VIII?
Article VIII of the IMF Articles sets out permissible restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions; 139 in particular, Article VIII(2)(a) prohibits members from imposing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions, un-

135. Id.
136. Section 1 envisages this broad economic benefit to be realized by the enhancement of effective functioning of the international monetary system through the members' compliance with their Section 1
undertakings.
137. Debating China's Exchange, supra note 98, at 72.
138. This, in turn, could threaten political stability. See Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at 2; Debating
China's Exchange, supra note 98, at 71 (claiming that a properly valued RMB would reduce China's current
account surplus between six and twelve percent of GDP, an amount currently equal to $150-$300 billion).
139. Section 2 prohibits restrictions on current payments; Section 3 prohibits discriminatory currency practices; and Section 4 provides for the convertibility of foreign-held balances resulting from current account
transaction. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. VIII, July 22, 1944, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa08.htm..
See generally ANNAMARA VrERBO, DISPUTE SETTLEMENTF OVER EXCHANGE MEAsuREs AFFECTING TRADE AND LNVESTMEN-TS: THE OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS OF THE IMF, VTO, AND THE ICSID (2008), available at htp://papers.ssm.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract id=1 15467.
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less the IMF approves otherwise.140 This provision is subject to Articles VII(3)(b) and
XIV(2), which provide for circumstances under which members may deviate from their
Article VIII(2)(a) obligations.141
Article VII(2) places only limited restrictions on members' monetary sovereignty. 42
More specifically, the Section (2)(a) obligation concerns only the transactions of a "current" nature and does not extent to capital account transactions.1 43 Restrictions on capital
transactions are permitted so long as payments for current account are not restricted or
unduly delayed.144 There is no indication that China's current account payment is unduly
delayed by the country's capital controls. Therefore, although China maintains tight restrictions on its capital account,145 the controls almost certainly would not render China's
exchange regime in breach of Article VIII.
As noted in Section II(B), the RMB is fully convertible under the currency accounts,
with payments for goods and services subject only to examination to ensure the legality
and genuineness of the underlying transactions. 146 Because a requirement to report all
exchange transactions to a government body for statistical purposes does not in itself violate the IMF Articles, a mere examination of a transaction following such reporting to
ascertain the authenticity of the underlying transactions does not amount to a violation.
This permission is particularly given so that no restrictions are placed on the underlying
transaction except the requirement that the transaction must be genuine. A forbiddance
on payment in the name of a fraudulent transaction does not violate Article VIII.
Furthermore, the IMF has defined exchange restrictions according to a technical criterion that disregards the economic effect or underlying purpose of the restrictions. 147
Therefore, China's exchange regime cannot violate Article VIII simply by virtue of the
regime's associated impact.
As to the exchange control, the scope of impermissible exchange control under Article
VII(2)(a) is narrow by definition. Exchange control regulations amount to an impermissible exchange restriction under Article VIII(2)(a) only if the measure (1) unduly delays
the payments in transactions which involve foreign currencies; (2) caps the availability of
foreign currencies; and (3) adopts a procedure which is unreasonable or imposes on the
party a disproportionate burden.148 Because China's exchange controls are not accused of
140. Articles of Agreement, supra note 139. Unlike the current Article IV, Article VIII has not been
amended since Bretton Woods.
141. Article VII(3)(b) provides that IMF approval can be given by a declaration that the member's currency
is scarce, whilst Article XIV(2) provides that a member may upon notification to the IMF, maintain its current foreign exchange restriction as a transitional arrangement, even if the restriction is inconsistent with
Article VIII(2)(a). In order to maintain a current foreign exchange restriction under Article XIV(2), the member is only required to continuously evaluate its needs to maintain such transitional arrangement.
142. CLAus D. ZIMMERMANN, JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION BFTVvEEN THE IMF AND THE WVTO AND
ITS IMPACT ON TIIF PREVENqrION OF MONETARY PROTECTIONSM 10 (2008), available at http://pa-

pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfinabstract _id=l 151802.
143. Examples of capital account transactions include loans, equity investments, and inward and outward
direct foreign investment. Indeed, Article VI(3) expressly permits restrictions on capital movement.
144. ViTERBO, supra note 139, at 10.
145. External Liberalization, spra note 15.
146. Id. at 458.
147. ZLJMMERMANN, supra note 142, at 11.
148. VITERSO, supra note 139, at 10 (examples of disproportionate burden include an out-of-proportion
increase in cost of acquiring more foreign currencies).

VOL. 43, NO. 3

IS CHINA A "CURRENCY MANIPULATOR"?

1285

exhibiting these features, the issue will not be analyzed further, and it is safe to assume
that its exchange control does not amount to an impermissible restriction under Article
VIII.
C.

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

As a member of the WTO, 14 9 China's substantive and procedural laws and regulations
must comply with all of its WTO obligations and commitments. 150 For the purposes of
China's currency policy, Article XV of the GATT and the SCM Agreement are particularly relevant. This section proceeds in two parts: subsection (1) evaluates China's compliance with any applicable obligations existing under the GATT, while subsection (2)
examines China's compliance with the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement.
1. GATD51
Article XV of the GATr recognizes the link between trade and exchange rate policies
(such that an exchange action can potentially influence trade issues, whilst trade action can
affect exchange issues). In this context, Article XV(4) provides that members shall not (1)
"frustrate" the intent of the provisions of the GATT by an "exchange action"; or (2) "frus152
trate" the intent of the IMF Articles by "trade action."
a. Exchange Action Versus Trade Action
The categorization of China's exchange regime as either an exchange action or a trade
action directly impacts upon the restraints imposed by Article XV. For example, if the
regime is regarded as an exchange action and not a trade action, China does not infringe
Article XV even if the regime frustrates the intent of the IMF Articles' provisions. It is
also theoretically possible for China's exchange arrangement to amount to both an exchange action and a trade action (in which case China would breach Article XV if it frustrates either the intent of the GAIT or that of the IMF Articles). 5 3
149. China acceded to the WTO in 2001 following 15 years negotiating entry. SeeProtocol of Accession of
the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001). For details of China's commitments, seealso
CHING CIRIONG( & CIING HUNG-Y.,
HANDBOOK ON CHINA'S WTO AccuSSION AND ris LIMPACTS
(World Scientific 2003) (detailing China's commitments to the WTO). See generally SIMON LESTER &
BRYAN MERCURIO, WORLD TRADE LAW 97-101 (Hart Publishing 2008) (explaining the process of Accession
in the WTO).
150. See generally Protocol of Accession, spra note 149.
151. This section will limit its analysis to Article XV, which is generally regarded as the most feasible
argument used in discussions involving currency manipulation. While some have attempted to use Article I
(most favoured nation) and/or a nonviolation (Article XXII) claim against China, such claims are clearly
inappropriate and will not be discussed. For discussion, see Proctor, supra note 51, at 1345-47 (discussing the
inapplicability of a claim based on Article I); See also Staiger & Sykes, supra note 59, at 33-34 (concluding that
a nonviolation claim would be difficult to prove given that China initiated and maintained a currency peg
prior to its accession to the "TO in 2001). For the difficulty in making out a nonviolation claim, see also
Japan-Film, WT/DS44/R, adopted Apr. 22, 1998.
152. Articles of Agreement, supra note 139, at art. XV(4) (providing that "contracting parties shall not, by
exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of
the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.").
153. Virtues and Trade, supra note 61, at 221. Staiger and Sykes make the point that the LIF Articles are
concerned with the impact of exchange rate policies on trade imbalances, the GATT/WTO is concerned with
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In evaluating this issue, it is important to remember that trade action and exchange
action are distinct from each other. 5 4 Exchange action relates to the currency and capital,
and concerns matters such as currency convertibility or capital movement. 5 5 On the
other hand, trade action concerns the domestic or cross-border flow of goods and services. 156 An exchange action and a trade action may both similarly impact the balance of
payment or the level of foreign reserves; 5 7 the two actions, however, have different aims
and remain distinct from each other.
In our opinion, it is more appropriate to categorize China's exchange regime as an
exchange action because the regime involves a currency peg, thereby requiring policies
that manage capital movement and regulate currency convertibility. Although some commentators contend that the regime is a trade action, in that the regime contributes to the
relatively low price of Chinese exports and the relatively high price of foreign imports
(which in turn affect the flow of goods from China), 5 8 such a characterization misinterprets the objectives of Article XV. If the drafters had intended for any action that has a
trade "effect" to be deemed a "trade action," then the relevant section would likely have
been rephrased to something along the lines of "action which affects trade," as opposed to
using the more specific language of "trade action." The use of the more specific term of
"trade action" should not be ignored or discounted: a country will frustrate the intent of
the IMF Articles only by trade action, as opposed to by an action that has the effect of a
trade action.
b.

Does China's Exchange Regime Frustrate the Intent of the GAFF?

Having concluded that China's exchange regime is an exchange action, it must now be
determined whether China has by this exchange action frustrated the intent of the GATT.
Unfortunately, Article XV provides very limited guidance as to what would be a permitted
form of an exchange rate arrangement, 159 elaborating neither on the "intent of the
GATT" nor the meaning of "frustrate."16
i.

°

The Meaning of Frustrate

The Interpretative Note of GATT Article XV(4) indicates that the word "frustrate"
denotes the frustration of the spirit of the relevant agreements and articles:
the impact on trade volumes. See Staiger and Sykes, supra note 59, at 5-6; For discussion on the relationship
between the IMF and WTO, see Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's
Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreement, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 561 (2002).
154. The European PoliticalCommunity, 29 BRIT.Y.B. IN-t'L L. 383, 422 n.3 (1952).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. For example, an import quota, which is a trade action, may positively affect the level of foreign reserve
to the same extent as an exchange action which upholds an undervalued exchange rate. Similarly, the import
quota may improve the balance of payment to the same extent as maintenance of an undervalued exchange
rate.
158. Virtues and Trade, supra note 61, at 221-23.
159. Chris Brown, China's GA7T Bid. Why All The Fuss About Currency Controls?, 3 PAC. Rim L. & POL'YJ.
57, 80 (1994).
160. Id. Article XV(4) has never previously been challenged in dispute settlement, which further complicates
applying the Article to China's exchange regime.
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The word "frustrate" is intended to indicate, for example, that infringements of the
letter of any Article of this Agreement by exchange action shall not be regarded as a
violation of that Article if, in practice, there is no appreciabledeparturefrom the intent of the

Article. Thus, a contracting party which, as part of its exchange control operated in
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, requires payment to be received for its exports in its own currency or in the currency of
one or more members of the International Monetary Fund will not thereby be
deemed to contravene Article XI or Article X1II .... 161
Therefore, a mere infringement of a particular GATT or IMF provision does not in
itself frustrate the intent, for the purposes of Article XV(4). The intent is not frustrated so
62
long as the infringement preserves the spirit of the agreement or the article.
The interpretive note, however, does not entirely clarify the situation as it merely explains the object of frustration without actually resolving the meaning of "frustrate." Because the GATT is an agreement between members, principles in contract law may shed
light on the meaning of "frustrate." A contract can be "frustrated" by the occurrence of
events or circumstances that render the performance of the contract virtually impossible.' 63 The frustration in turn discharges parties of their obligations under the contract.' 64 Contract law's concept of frustration, however, only partially assists the
interpretation of "frustrate" under the GATT. This divergence is mainly because the
GATT and the contract law differ in their object of frustration. Under contract law, it is
the contract that is frustrated when the contract's performance is rendered impossible by
some unforeseen event. By contrast, the GATT prohibits the frustration of intent, rather
than the frustration of performance of an action. Therefore, the extent to which the
meaning of frustration under contract law can be applied to the GATT is uncertain. This
uncertainty renders unclear how to translate the frustration threshold of rendering the
contract's performance "virtually impossible" into the context of the GATT.
A possible counterpart to the GATT, and the idea of the "performance of the intent of
GATT" can be taken from the notion in contract law of the "performance of the contract." Article XV of the GATT can be interpreted to prohibit China's exchange regime
from rendering impossible the realization of the intent of the GATT. If this situation
were the case, the frustration threshold would be difficult to satisfy, as China's exchange
regime would not frustrate the "intent" of the GATT even if it only leaves some possibility of the "intent" being realized.
The Black's Law Dictionary meaning of "frustrate," however, reveals that to frustrate the
GATT's intent can merely mean hindering the intent's attainment, without going to the
extreme of rendering impossible or preventing totally the GATT's intent. 165 Therefore,
to "frustrate" the GATT's intent assumes a spectrum of meanings that range from
161. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Interp. Note to XV(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (emphasis added).
162. RAj BiIALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A TRFATISE ON -rIF,GENERAL AGREEAIFNT ON TARIFFS AND

TRADE 1172 (2005).
163. STEPHEN HALL, LAW OF CoNTRACT IN HONG KONG: CASES AND CON.MIENTARY 699 (2008).
164. Id.

165. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 679 (B. Garner 7th ed. 1999) (frustration means "The prevention or hindering of the attainment of a goal.").

FALL 2009

1288

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

"preventing totally" or "rendering impossible" the attainment of the intent, to merely
"hindering" the achievement of the intent.
ii. The Compatibility of China's Exchange Regime with the Intent of the GATT
Many commentators believe that it is "highly unlikely,I 66 if not impossible, 167 to enforce rights and obligations under Article XV(4). For instance, Subramanian and Mattoo
state that Article XV(4) provides "too vague an obligation to provide a basis for effective
enforcement,"' 168 and furthermore question whether (even if such a claim is actionable) a
panel would, with no existing jurisprudence on the issues, make a ruling against an undervalued exchange rate. 169 Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth agree with Subramanian and Matto,
and go even furtherby suggesting that the Addenda to the interpretation of Article XV(4)
provides that another "specific GATT article needs to be frustrated in an important way
before the strictures of Article XV(4) can be invoked." 170 With no jurisprudence on the
issue and the uncertainty of whether the article is even actionable (and if so, under what
circumstances and conditions), it is highly improbable that a panel will ever find an exchange regime incompatible with the intent of the GATT.
Even if we assume, however, that an action under Article XV(4) is justiciable (with no
other conditions) and discount the possibility of panel discomfort in being the first to rule
on the issue, it is still unlikely that China's exchange regime would be found to frustrate
the intent of the GATT. This situation is the case even when the most liberal definition
of frustrate-merely "hindering" the achievement of the intent of the GATT.
If "frustrate" is to take the meaning of merely hindering, then China's exchange regime-as an exchange action-would arguably frustrate the intent of the GATT and
hence infringes Article XV(4) if the GATT/WTO is viewed as an agreement/organization
that exists solely to liberalize trade through the reduction and removal of barriers to trade.
If such an assumption is correct, then China's exchange regime arguably frustrates the
intent of the GATT/WTO, China's currency peg' resembles an export subsidy and an
import tax, and therefore could constitute a barrier to trade. 71' Furthermore, the capital
controls could also be seen to be delaying (or, at the very least, possibly delaying) the
realization of trade liberalization in goods and services. 172 But is this explanation the correct understanding of the "intent" of GATT?
On the one hand, such a view could potentially find support from the historical background against which the GATT was drafted, when countries invariably resorted to vari166. See Subramanian and Mattoo, supra note 10, at 4.
167. See GARY C. HUFBAUER FT AL., U.S.-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING STAKES 19
(2006).
168. Subramanian and Mattoo, supra notelO. at 4.
169. Id.
170. HUFBAUER et al., supra note 167, at 19 (emphasis added).
171. BIALA, svpra note 162, at 1169; see also Subramanian and Mattoo, supra note 10, at 4 (calling exchange
rate undervaluation "both an import tax and an export subsidy and.., hence the most mercantilist policy
imaginable," while also recognizing that exchange rate policy is currently largely outside the framework of
GATT and the SCMI Agreement).
172. MOHArIiE) EL-ERIAN, WIE.N MARKETS COLLIDE: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE AGE OF
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CIIANGE 151-192 (2008).
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ous exchange actions to boost exports and discourage imports. 173 Under such
circumstances, it is possible that the drafters inserted Article XV into the GATT to prevent similar exchange actions from undermining trade liberalization.1 74 Because China's

exchange regime arguably resembles the then-prevalent practice of deliberately maintaining an undervalued currency, it follows that China's exchange regime would frustrate the
intent of the GATT.
The view that the intent of the GATT is solely to liberalize trade, however, is an incomplete and arguably inaccurate proposition. In this regard, the preamble to the GATT
sheds light on a fuller view on the intent of the agreement. The preamble reads as
follows:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange
of goods.. Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction
of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce ....175
The preamble reveals that the contracting parties of the GATT (now WTO Members)
agreed to the GATT under a common consideration to conduct trade and economic relations in such a manner so as to achieve the goals of "raising standards of living, ensuring
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world, and expanding the production and exchange of goods." 176 The contracting parties agreed to achieve these goals by
entering into reciprocal and mutually beneficial agreements, which aim to reduce tariffs
and remove other barriers to trade.
Under such a reading, tariff reductions and the removal of trade barriers are merely the
means to achieve the goal of increasing economic welfare. One may infer from the stated
goals of "developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods" that the GATT purports to liberalize trade. But, equally one
can maintain that such a view is too far-stretched, and that trade liberalization is merely a
way to achieve goals encompassed in the preamble.1 77 It follows that even if China's ex-

173. BHALA, supra note 162, at 1169. These actions included manipulating currency devaluation, adopting a
dual exchange rate and instituting a license system for exchanging foreign currency.
174. Id.
175. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Preamble, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
176. Id.
177. That is, the goals of "raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world
and expanding the production and exchange of goods." Id.
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change regime undermines trade liberalization,17 8 it only undermines a means to achieve
179
the intent of the GATT but not the intent itself.
Unfortunately, neither the GATT nor any of the other relevant WTO agreements
clearly sets out its "intent." Regrettably, trade scholarship does not adequately address the
issue either.Is 0 Perhaps even more regrettable is the fact that the members themselves
now do not even appear to agree on the purpose, aims, and objectives of the VVTO as a
whole.lsi It is therefore unlikely that they would come to an agreement now as to the
meaning of the "intent" of the GATT.
With that in mind, even if it is accepted that trade liberalization is one of many intents
of the GATT, it does not necessarily follow that the regime has frustrated the intent of the
GATT. In fact, it could be argued that China's exchange regime is an arrangement that
furthers the intent of the GAIT. As Section llI(B)(3) of this article noted, China's exchange regime assists the implementation of institutional reform which facilitates China's
trade liberalization.i1 2 In this regard, China's exchange regime is directly compatible with
the GATT's purported intent to liberalize trade. Furthermore, a revaluation of the RMB
that could potentially bring disastrous economic consequences and social upheaval (both
in China and elsewhere, given China's increasing importance to the world economy),
would seem to be contrary to enhancing the welfare of the world.i s3 Viewed in such a
light, revaluation could even be seen to infringe the intent of the GATT.
Based on the above examination, even when analyzed under the most liberal definition
of "frustrate," China almost certainly does not infringe Article XV(4) because its exchange
regime cannot be proven to be an exchange action that frustrates the intent of the GATT.
c. Does China's Exchange Regime Frustrate the Intent of the IMF Articles?
As detailed in Section (a) of this article, China's exchange regime should be regarded as
an exchange action as opposed to a trade action. Therefore, any Article XV(4) complaint
178. Of course, the term "trade liberalization" is not defined in the GATT (nor in any other WTO agreement) and its meaning is subject to interpretation. For instance, does it mean a reduction of any trade barriers (regardless of the size of the reduction or barrier), complete anti-protectionism or harmonization of laws
and barriers? Trade scholarship has not adequately addressed or definitively resolved the issue.
179. It is not even clear whether devaluation has any effect on trade volume or magnitude. See Staiger and
Sykes, supra note 59, at 11-25. See also Steven Dunaway et al., How Robust are Estimates of Equilibrium Real
Ercbange Rates: The Case of China (IMF, working paper 06/220, Oct. 2006).
180. For an interesting discussion, see Steve Charnovitz, Triangulatingthe World Trade Organization, 96 AM.
J. IN-r'L L. 28 (2002).
181. For discussion, see Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and its InstitutionalImpediments, 8 MELB. J. INT'L L. 198
(2007).
182. See supra Part M, at § B(3)(b). China's exchange regime intends to minimize the economic and social
instability brought by the institutional reform whose aim is to facilitate China's trade liberalization. China's
exchange regime therefore contributes to the smooth implementation of a reform which is significant, if not
vital, to successful trade liberalization in China.
183. See supra Part Im, at § B(3)(b). Indeed, some economic research demonstrates the ability to use exchange rate policy can be used as a tool for economic development. See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 42, at 1;
BIIALA, supra note 162, at 1174. This is not to suggest that exchange rates cannot create negative externalities. Moreover, Subramanian and Mattoo suggest that appropriate levels of exchange rate among China and
undervalued oil-exporting nations could have increased world trade by roughly S500 billion. Subramanian &
Mattoo, svpra note 10, at 2-3.
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must prove that the regime frustrates the intent of the GATT.184 Assuming, arguendo,
that the exchange regime amounts to a trade action, China's regime does not necessarily
185
frustrate the intent of the IMF Articles.
The IMF Articles do not expressly state their purpose, but Article I does set out the
86
Article I
purposes of the IMF, which perhaps hint at the purposes of the articles.'
provides:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.
(ii)

To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all
members as primary objectives of economic policy.

(iii)

To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of
current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set
87
forth in this Article.'
The IMF Articles can be read as purporting to eliminate foreign exchange restrictions
that suppress world trade growth.'s8 More specifically, the articles have been said to en184. It must be noted that argument under this provision suffers from the same ambiguity problem with the
meaning of "frustrate" as that in relation to the frustration of the intent of GATT.
185. For the purposes of completing the analysis, we assume that Article XV(4) can be violated even if it is
deemed lawful (or, perhaps more appropriately, not deemed unlawful) under Article IV of the LIF Articles.
Such an assumption may be incorrect-meaning in order to have a violation of Article XV(4) of GATT there
We only note that Article XV(4) is a very brief
first needs to be a violation of Article V of the IMF Articles.
provision, and it would be unusual, if not extremely odd, for a provision relating to monetary and exchange
issues to be inconsistent with the WTO while at the same time being consistent with the relevant provision in
the IMF Articles. It would seem more likely that if drafters wanted such a result, the provision would have
been more carefully and specifically drafted to accomplish this purpose. For further discussion, see Proctor,
supra note 51, at 1348-49 (expressing skepticism that there can be a breach of the WTO obligation without a
breach of the relevant provision in the IMF Articles).
186. Sharobeem, supra note 28, at 725.
187. IMF, Articles of Agreement, art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
188. The European Political Community, supra note 154, at 422 n.3.
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compass two principal purposes: (1) to promote the international monetary cooperation,
and (2) to promote exchange stability.5 9
In relation to the purpose of promoting exchange stability, the IMF Legal Department
maintains that the Second Amendment modified Article TV's objective to promote the
stability of the exchange rate system, as opposed to the stability of the exchange rate.' 90
One must note, however, the members' reluctance to concurrently amend the wording of
Article 1.191 This vagueness could have been intentional, and members might have intended that the purposes of the IMF remain promoting exchange stability while at the
same time shifting the core of Article IV to focus on the stability of exchange rate system
due to the elimination of the par value system. Therefore, the purpose of the IMF Articles can be taken as: (1) the removal of foreign exchange restrictions, which negatively
affect world trade growth; (2) the promotion of the international monetary cooperation;
and (3) the promotion of exchange stability.
China's exchange regime is consistent with these three purposes, and therefore does not
frustrate the intent of the IMF Articles. With regards to the first purpose, it is undeniable
that China's exchange regime involves foreign exchange restrictions and is therefore inconsistent with the goal of removing foreign exchange restrictions per se. The foreign
exchange restrictions that China's exchange regime imposes, however, do not necessarily
adversely impact world trade growth. By contrast, the regime's foreign exchange restrictions help shape a healthier financial and monetary system within China, which ultimately
facilitates the world trade growth. 192 As to the second purpose, although China's regime
might not actively promote international monetary cooperation, there is no evidence suggesting that the regime hinders such cooperation. With regard to the third purpose, the
regime by design promotes exchange stability. The inherent nature of China's exchange
regime means that it is unlikely that the regime would undermine the promotion of exchange stability-the essence of the regime is to link the RMB with a basket of currency,
which in itself promotes exchange stability.
d. Article XV(9) Immunity
Parts (b) and (c) demonstrate that China's exchange regime does not frustrate the intent
of either the GATT or the IMF Article, and is therefore consistent with Article XV(4).
Nevertheless, even if China's exchange arrangement is found to be inconsistent with its
Article V obligations, Article XV(9)(a) offers China potential immunity from the infringement. Article XV(9)(a) reads:
Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude: (a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agree189. Allan T. Marks, Exchange Control Regulations Within the Meaning of the Bretton Woods Agreement: A
Comparison ofJudicialInterpretationin the United States and Europe, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 104 (1990).
190. IMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 12. The IMF Articles envisage the IMF to promote international monetary cooperation by providing a forum for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems, promoting exchange stability, maintaining orderly exchange arrangements among members,
and avoiding competitive exchange depreciation.
191. LMF Article IV Overview, supra note 1, at 12 n.15.
192. See supra Part HI, at § B (3)(b);
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ment of the International Monetary Fund or with that contracting party's special
193
exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
Article XV(9)(a) therefore provides that the IMF Articles should prevail over the GATT
if the two agreements conflict with regard to an exchange restriction. 194 Although the
scope of this immunity is not well defined or elaborated upon, Article XV(9)(a) arguably
offers an IMF member complete immunity against any accusation that it has breached
Article XV(4) 195 as "[n]othing in this Agreement" should be interpreted as nothing in the
GATT, including Article XV(4).196 It follows that if China's exchange regime complies
with the IMF Articles, Article XV(4) cannot preclude China's use of its exchange regime
even if the regime breaches the Article. 197 Of course, Article XV(9)(a) does not preclude
the regime from breaching Article XV(4) if the regime breaches any IMF Articles; Article
XV(9)(a) merely shields the regime from any potential GATT inconsistency if it is compliant with the IMF Articles.
2.

SCM Agreement

The SCM Agreement does not define a subsidy in terms of economic effect; instead, a
measure considered a subsidy only if it falls within the criteria set out in Article 1. Moreover, not all subsidies are prohibited; instead, subsidies are prohibited only when they fall
within the additional requirements of the SCM Agreement.
a.

Prohibited Subsidies Under the SCM Agreement

According to the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is actionable (that is, it can be challenged
under the Agreement) if it involves the government or a public body within the territory
giving (1) a financial contribution (or a form of income or price support in the sense of
GATT Article XVI)198 which confers a benefit' 99 and is specific.200 The three criteria are
cumulative.
Article 1.1 lists several types of government (or the public body) measures that fall
within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, if:
193. IMF, Articles of Agreement, art. XV(9)(a), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
194. BHALA, supra note 162, at 1171.
195. Id. In fact the immunity extends to cover breaches of any Articles of the GATT. Therefore, provided
that China's exchange regime complies with IMF, which Section 2 of this essay shows that it does, it is
shielded from any potential GATT"suit.
196. BHALA, supra note 162, at 1171. For useful discussion on Article IV(9) as applied in WTO jurisprudence, See Panel Report, Dominican Republic-MeasuresAffecting the Importationand Internal Sale of Cigarettes,
1 7.106-.122, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 2004) (issue not subject to the appeal).
197. Article XI of GATS provides even stronger language to this effect, stating: "...nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of the members of the International Monetary Fund under the
Articles of Agreement of the Fund, including the use of exchange actions which are in conformity with the
Articles of Agreement." General Agreement on Trade and Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article XI, Payments and Transfers-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS];
198. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article l.1(a)(l)-(2), Definition of a Subsidy-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCIM Agreement].
199. Id. art. 1.1(b).
200. Id. art. 1.2.
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(1) its practice involves a direct transfer of funds, or a potential direct transfers of
2
funds or liabilities; 01
2 02
(2) it forgoes or not collects a government revenue which is otherwise due;
(3) it purchases goods or provides goods or services other than general infrastructure;20 3 or
(4) it pays a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out the
practices mentioned in (1) to (3), in a manner which resemble that normally carried
24
out by the government.
A subsidy satisfies the specificity requirement of Article 2 if the authority or the law
expressly limits the availability of the subsidy to an enterprise or a group of certain enterprises. 20 5 On the other hand, a subsidy does not meet the specificity requirement if it is
available for all sectors.
A subsidy will also satisfy the specificity requirement if it is considered to be a prohibited subsidy under Article 3.206 Article 3 is satisfied if the subsidy is contingent (in law or
in fact) on export performance.207 Export performance can be either the sole or one of
several conditions on which the subsidy is contingent upon.20
b.

Does China's Exchange Regime Comply with Article 1?

i.

Conferring a Benefit by FinancialContribution, a Form of Income or Price Support

While it is generally agreed that China's exchange regime does not involve income or
price support within the meaning of the GATT Article XVI,209 the question of whether
the regime entails the government making a "financial contribution" is more contentious.
Critics of China's exchange regime contend that China makes a financial contribution to
2 10
the Chinese exporters in the form of undervalued currency.
In our opinion, however, China's exchange regime cannot be said to entail a "financial
contribution" within the definition of Article 1.1.211 First, it must be noted that Article
1.1 is not an "effects" test, and therefore it is not the case that all government actions that

201. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(i).

202. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii).
203. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii).
204. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv).
205. Id. art. 2.1(a). The SCM Agreement defines "certain enterprises" as "an enterprise or industry or group
of enterprises or industries" id: Article 2.1.
206. Id. art. 2.3.
207. Id. art. 3.1(a).
208. Id. art. 3.1(b).
209. Killion, supra note 2, at 55-56.
210. See, e.g., Leviton, supra note 107, at 256.
211. It should be noted that the Panel found the list of possible "financial contributions" to be exhaustive,
and therefore government measures falling outside the scope of the list cannot be deemed to be subsidies.
Panel Report, United States-Measures TreatingErport Restraintsas Subsidies, T 8.69, WT/DS 194/R (June 29,
2001) [hereinafter Export Restraints Panel Report]. Most commentators agree that Article 1.1 sets out an
exclusive, exhaustive list of what constitutes a financial contribution. See A Survey of Views Regarding Whether
Exchange-Rate Misalignment is a Countervailable, Prohibited Export Subsidy Under the Agreements of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), Apr. 2007, http://www.faircurrency.org/presscenter/surveyofsviews04O7.pdf
(views of James L. Bacchus and Ira Shapiro, Counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers).

VOL. 43, NO. 3

IS CHINA A "CURRENCY MANIPULATOR"?

1295

benefit an exporter (in this case) will be deemed to be a financial contribution. 212 Second,
China's exchange regime involves no direct transfer of assets from the government to
exporters. 2 13 The regime therefore does not entail a financial contribution as defined in
Article 1.1(i) or (ii).2 14 At most, the government can be said to have directed the PBC or
the relevant authorities to (1) purchase U.S. Treasury bonds with a view to sterilize the
PBC's interference in the exchange market, (2) issue or buy back the RMB, or (3) buy or
sell other currencies. Third, the claim that China's exchange regime, through the maintenance of an undervalued currency and thus the elimination of the necessity for hedging,
constitutes a governmental service under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) 215 does not withstand scrutiny. Neither a financial instrument nor currency can properly be categorized as "goods
or services," the purchase or provision of which is considered as a form of financial contribution under Article 1.1 (iii).216 The Panel in United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies reached a similar conclusion:
The negotiating history confirms that items (i)-(iii) [of Article 1.1 (a)(1)] ...limit these
kinds of [government] measures to the transfer of economic resources from a government to a private entity. Under subparagraphs (i)-(iii), the government acting on its
own behalf is effecting that transfer by directly providing something of value-either
2 17
money, goods, or services-to a private entity.
China's exchange rate policy may indeed benefit exporters, but the benefit is not obtained from an explicit transfer of capital, goods, or services from the government to private businesses in order to promote exports.2 18 In fact, China's exchange rate regime does
not involve the transfer of public assets to private exporters. Instead, the regime simply
controls exchange rate fluctuations through the purchase or sale of currencies. Thus, the
contention that China's exchange rate regime is a "governmental service" is overly expan2 19
sive and unsupported by the text of Article 1.1 and WTO jurisprudence.
212. See Export Restraints Panel Report, supra note 211, at T 8.62 ("It does not follow...that every government intervention that might in economic theory be deemed a subsidy with the potential to distort trade is a
subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. Such an approach would mean that the 'financial contribution' requirement would effectively be replaced by a requirement that the government action in question
be commonly understood to be a subsidy that distorts trade."). See also
id., at T 8.65-68.
213. Interestingly, the "Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act" labels an undervalued currency to be a "direct
transfer of funds". See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1654. See also
Survey of Views, supra note 192 (views of
David Hartquist, Terence P. Stewart, Wiley Rein and Fielding and John Magnus).
214. See Survey of Views, supra note 192 (views of Bacchus and Shapiro).
215. China Currency Coalition, The Section
301 Petition,
at 49 (Sept. 9, 2004).
216. See Survey of Views, supranote 211 (views of Bacchus and Shapiro; Gary Hufbauer).
217. Export Restraints Panel Report, 8.65, WT/DS194/R Oune 29, 2001).
218. Benetah questions whether "it is possible that the provision or the conversion of foreign currency at a
fixed rate could be perceived as equivalent to a service given by the Chinese government or by bodies entrusted by it." Marc Benetah, China's Fixed Exchange Rate for the Yuan: Could the United States Challenge It in
theWTO as a Subsidy, ASIL INSIGHTS, (October 2003), available at http://www.asil.org/insighl 17.cfm. Even
challenged as a de facto export subsidy, however, China's exchange regime does not appear to fit into the
Illustrative List of prohibited subsidies annexed to the SCM Agreement. Benetah agrees, noting "it does not
seem that the United States could successfully invoke" any of the items mentioned on the prohibited list. Id.
219. Staiger and Sykes briefly analyze an alternative argument based on the premise that the government
makes a "financial contribution" as a result of its exchange rate intervention by forgoing revenue otherwise
due. See Staiger and Sykes, supra note 59, at 32. This argument would likely fail for a number of reasons,
including the fact that the revenue foregone would not be owed to the government by the exporter. The
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ii. Benefit
Even assuming, arguendo, that China has made a financial contribution, it is nevertheless difficult to establish a benefit to Chinese exporters.220 On this point, critics make two
arguments in support of the contention that Chinese exporters receive a "benefit:" (1) the
undervalued currency lowers labor costs for Chinese exporters, enabling their products to
be more competitive compared with the U.S. products, and thereby conferring a benefit
on the Chinese exporters in the form of price advantage which they could not otherwise
obtain in the open market;221 and (2) China's exchange regime confers a benefit on Chinese exporters in the sense that the exporters do not need to hedge against currency fluctuations. 222 Critics assert that both cases provide cost advantages to exporters, and that
those cost advantages constitute a benefit under Article 1.1(b) because the exporters would
be unable to attain the same advantage on the open market.2 23 This argument thus hinges
2
upon the demonstration that the RMB is substantially undervalued. 24
Even then, however, whether there is a benefit to exporters is ambiguous for at least
two reasons. First, an increase in sales volume at lower unit prices does not necessarily
lead to an increase in profit.225 Therefore, it is difficult to state with certainty that exporters have benefited from the undervalued RMB. Second, while the stable currency arrangements might save hedging costs, it does not necessarily follow that the exporters gain
additional profits in real terms if regime-initiated price fluctuation is taken into
226
account.
iii. Specificity
Even if China's exchange regime involves a "financial contribution" that confers a "benefit" on exporters, China's exchange regime does not expressly or in effect limit the beneargument would also likely fail as conclusive economic data demonstrating the rise and fall of tariff revenue
and the elasticity of demand of imports would be extremely difficult to procure.
220. In the view of Staiger and Sykes, the real effects of currency misalignment decrease over time (even to
zero) and thus currency misalignment would certainly offer no benefit to exporters. See id. at 1-25, 32.
221. Id.
222. Leviton, suipra note 107, at 264.
223. WTO jurisprudence typically equates "benefit" with whether the recipient has received a "financial
contribution" on terms more favorable than the "market". See Report of the VWTO Appellate Body, Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Erport of Civilian Aircraft, Wrf/DS70/AB/R,
157, (1999). For the view that
China's exchange rate is a "benefit", see Survey of Views, supra note 211 (views of Bacchus Shapiro; Gary
Hufbauer).
224. As illustrated throughout this article, such clear-cut economic analysis is currently unavailable. Additionally, Denters argues that so long as China's exchange regime is compliant with the IMF Articles, the
VWTO could not be deemed to be a prohibited export subsidy See Eric Denters, Manipulation ofExchange Rates
in International Law: The Chinese Yuan, ASIL INSIGHTS (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.asil.org/
insigh 118.cfm.
225. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY:

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS

249-50 (Mason, Ohio, Thomson/South-Western 2005) (showings that profit maximization does not necessarily occur at a point where a larger volume of products are sold at a lower price. Rather the profit is maximized at a point where the marginal revenue equals to the marginal cost).
226. This is due to the fact that exporters will have to hedge against inflation risks and interest rate risk
which associate with the fixed exchange rate regime. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. WILLIAMSON,
MACROECONOMICS 516-21 (Boston, Pearson Addison Wesley 2005) (showing how domestic price level and
interest rate are respectively susceptive to the change in foreign price level or interest rate under a fixed
exchange regime).
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fits to an enterprise or certain enterprises; instead, the subsidy is available to all sectors of
the economy. This situation is the case as according to Article 2.1(b), under which a
measure is not specific if the enterprises are automatically eligible upon satisfying some
objective criteria.2 27 To export is an objective criterion. Upon satisfying this objective
criterion, the exporter is automatically eligible for a certain magnitude of "benefit" flowing from the undervalued currency. The magnitude of the benefit is determined objectively by the amount of goods exported. Therefore, prima facie, China's exchange regime
fails to satisfy the specificity requirement. Hufbauer and Wong agree, stating:
An undervalued exchange rate is probably the least specific of any benefit that a government might confer. WTO case law in other subsidy disputes runs strongly against
the proposition that an undervalued exchange rate qualifies as a specific benefit. Public policy measures that are generally applicable to broad swaths of the economy are
not viewed by the VVTO as actionable subsidies; rather, for trade policy purposes, the
focus is on sector-specific benefits.

22

8

Subramanian and Mattoo summarize the situation more strongly and succinctly, stating:
WATO rules on export subsidies exclude exchange rates from their scope because of the
notion of specificity.229
iv.

Contingent on Export Performance

The specificity requirement can alternatively be satisfied by reason that the subsidy is
contingent on export performance. 230 This alternative path to satisfying the specificity
requirement is currently the preferred argument for critics of the Chinese regime. In
essence, critics maintain that China's exchange regime satisfies the specificity requirement
as it is contingent on anticipated export performance.231 More specifically, critics argue
that the exchange is contingent upon export performance, as it is only after the exporter is
paid in U.S. dollars that proceeds of the sale are converted into RMB at the undervalued
232
rate of exchange.
227. SCM Agreement, supra note 198, at art. 2.1(b).
228. Gary C. Hufbauer et al., China Bashing 2004 InternationalEconomics Policy Brieft Number PB04-5 8,
(Sept. 2004), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb04-5.pdf.
229. Subramanian and Mattoo, supra note 10, at 4. This is not to say that Subramanian and Mattoo believe
that exchange rates should remain outside the scope of the SCIM Agreement, stating "This is like having
disarmament negotiations on howitzers are haggled over while nuclear weapons remain beyond the scope of
negotiations." Id.
230. SCM Agreement, supra note 198, at art. 2.1(b).
231. See, e.g., China Currency Coalition, at 62-66 (arguing that China's currency policy is contingent in fact
upon export performance), available at http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org/petition.html. For halfhearted counter-argument, See Staiger and Sykes, supra note 59, at 31 (stating "A respectable argument might
be made, however, that an undervalued exchange rate tends to favor exporting firms if it has any real effects at
all (assuming that prices have not adjusted to offset it). Even if not formally contingent on export performance, therefore, any export stimulus resulting from an undervalued exchange rate is plausibly characterized as
an export subsidy). It should be noted that Staiger and Sykes agree that China's policies do not violate its
WTO commitments and further cast doubt as to any actual trade volume effect caused by misalignment. See
id. at 1-25. See, Benetah, upra note 218 (stating: "The specificity criterion [ ] does not seem to be an
insurmountable legal obstacle to challenging the Chinese fixed exchange rate as a de facto export subsidy").
232. See Survey of Views, spra note 211 (views of David A. Hartquist).
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Contingency on export performance can exist in law or in fact. 233 Because China's
legislative framework does not mandate that the benefit is contingent upon the exportation of goods, it cannot be said to require contingency on export performance in law.
At the outset, it must be noted that the "undervalued" rate of exchange is not only
available to exporters but is available to any person holding U.S. dollars; exporters do not
receive a more favorable rate of exchange than any other person in China. 234 Moreover,
when evaluating the facts and circumstances surrounding China's exchange rate policy
(assuming, arguendo, the exchange rate policies meet the financial contribution requirement of Article 1), it is clear that the policy depends on a plethora of non-export related
economic factors. Thus, while export performance may be one consideration of the Chinese government, its exchange regime is based on an aggregate of much broader initiatives. For instance, the maintenance of stable currency has allowed for stable growth,
curbed inflation, and prevented currency speculation from playing havoc with the economy. The stability of the currency has also been important to many other aspects of
China's economy, including foreign investment and infrastructure construction. Finally,
it is difficult to evaluate the relationship between China's exchange rate regime and the
country's export performance, and cannot be said at this time that China expected or
anticipated an increase in export earnings when it adopted its exchange rate regime as
illustrated in the preceding sections. China's exchange rate regime promotes economic
stability, and any conditionality upon export performance may merely be incidental rather
than intentional. In any event, proving any conditionality between exchange rates and
conditionality may be difficult as there is only a slight and narrow relationship of conditionality between exchange rate policy and export performance. For these reasons,
China's exchange rate regime cannot be said to be contingent upon export performance or
tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.

IV.

Concluding Analysis

Any currency value pegged to a currency or maintained against a basket of currencies is
controlled by the government. This situation is perhaps even more the case when the
weighting of the basket of currencies is not publicly disclosed. It is not hard, therefore to
conclude that the Chinese authorities influence and control the exchange regime. This
conclusion is almost beyond reasonable doubt. This article, however, moves beyond the
mere rhetoric and analyses whether China's exchange regime infringes its obligations
under general international law, the IMF Articles, or any WVTO agreement (the relevant
agreements being the GATT and SCM Agreement). In each case, we reach the conclusion that China does not violate its international obligations. This conclusion is reached
despite the fact that "undervalued exchange rates are the classic example of beggar-thy" 235
neighbour policies that both the IMF and WTO were set up to prevent. 1
233. SCM Agreement, sipra note 198, at art. 3.1.
234. See also Survey of Views, supra note 211 (views ofJames L. Bacchus and Ira Shapiro; Jonathon Sanford).
But see views of Terence P. Stewart; Wiley Rein & Fielding; and John Magnus (all arguing that conditions
other than export contingency may not necessarily undercut the de facto export-contingent nature of a subsidy). Id. See also Appellate Body report, US-Foreign Sales Corporation, WT/DS108/AB/R, Feb. 24, 2000.
235. Subramanian & Mattoo, supra note 10, at 4.
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Under general international law, there simply are not any limitations or obligations
upon countries when adopting their exchange rate policies. Thus, states have the freedom
to issue currency and inherent sovereignty to determine the value of the currency. Doing
so may certainly affect other country's rights, but it does not negate the sovereignty of a
nation to adopt its own exchange rate policies.
China's exchange regime is also compliant with its obligations under the IMF Articles.
More specifically, China's exchange arrangement (that is, linking the RMB to a basket of
currencies) is not inconsistent with Article IV(2), and cannot be proven to violate the
more specific provisions of Article IV(l). Most notably, based upon existing evidence, it is
not possible to conclude that China manipulates its currency for the purpose of gaining an
unfair advantage over other members. Finally, China's regime is consistent with Article
VIII as it cannot be shown that its capital controls unduly delays its current account
payment.
China's compliance is largely attributable to the nature of the current international system of exchange rate regulation. Simply stated, the current system of exchange rate regulation is one of soft law.2 36 Furthermore, the IMF Articles are so vaguely and broadly
worded that it is unlikely that any nation will ever be deemed to be acting inconsistently
with the IMF Articles. This vagueness is likely not the result of drafting error, but rather
intentional because the regulatory norms established by the IMF amount to external regulation of matters which are traditionally viewed as strictly domestic issues. Also, the drafting was done at a time when countries were particularly opposed to ceding any
sovereignty over to an international organization.2 37 While the Executive Board Decision
of 2007 may signal a shift towards stronger operational oversight, it remains to be seen
whether such a shift is possible given the politics behind the system, structure and workings of bilateral surveillance (not to mention the lack of a real enforcement mechanism or
effective sanctions). Thus, as presently drafted, China is in compliance with the IMF
Articles. If IMF members consider that a tighter regulation should be placed on the members, members should invoke Article IV(2)(c) and amend the regulatory regime.
China's exchange regime is also compliant with its WTO obligations. When viewed as
an exchange action, China's regime cannot be said to frustrate the intent of GATT in
contravention of Article XV given its role in raising living standards and employment not
in China and beyond. When viewed as a trade action, China's regime cannot be said to be
inconsistent with the intent of the IMF Articles given that it is consistent with the purposes of Article I of the IMF Articles.
Similarly, China's regime cannot be found to be inconsistent with its obligations under
the SCM Agreement. Simply stated, the SCM Agreement narrowly defines a prohibited
subsidy and we conclude that China's regime cannot be deemed to be a "financial contribution" which (1) confers a "benefit" and is (2) either "specific" or a "contingent on export
performance."2 38 Although opinions differ, we strongly believe that if the drafters had
236. QURESHI & ZIEGLER, svpra note 50, at 157.
237. Id. See also LESTER ET AL., supra note 149, at 66-68 (detailing the failure of the International trade
Organization, which includes a resistance to ceding sovereignty to an international organization so quickly
after the war).
238. Even ifChina's exchange rate regime was found to be in violation of the SCM Agreement, China could
claim that its measures fall under the Article 27 exception, which recognizes that subsidies can operate to
encourage economic growth and therefore exempts developing countries from the prohibition under Article
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wanted currency undervaluation to be a prohibited export subsidy they would have explicidy included it in the texts of the SCM Agreement.2 39 In our view, the likely reason for
the exclusion of currency undervaluation from the ambit of the SCM Agreement is because the WTO was meant to compliment, rather than usurp, the IMF. If WTO members now demand more rigorous WTO scrutiny on countries' exchange rate regime, it
240
may do so by amending the GATT or the SCM Agreement.
With China's exchange regime compliant with the IMF Articles and the relevant provisions of the WTO, the only other option available to the international community (barring amendment of the IMF Articles or relevant WTO agreement) is to negotiate a new
agreement or treaty to prohibit, manage, or counter the effects of controlled exchange
rate regimes. Until that time, however, China's exchange regime remains in compliance
with the international legal regime.

3.1(a)) for a period of eight years following entry into the WTO. As a developing country, China would
qualify for this exception and having entered the WTO on December 11,2001, it would still be covered by
the exception. Furthermore, the exemption can be extended if, in the view of the Committee, determine that
an extension of this period is justified after examining all the relevant economic financial and development
needs of the Member in question. In the past, China could have also claimed an exception under Article 28,
which allows for prohibited subsidy programs established before accession to the WTO to remain in place for
up to three years following accession, and Article 29, which permits countries transforming from centrallyplanned to market economies to use programs and measures necessary for that transformation for up to seven
years following accession. If China were eligible under these exceptions, they both have expired.
239. See also
HUFBAUER ST AL., suipra note 167, at 22-24.
240. Even Hufbauer concludes the chance of Member succeeding in a WTO dispute on this issue is "at best
modest." Id. at 16-24.
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